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INTRODUCTION
Through the entrapment defense, the law acknowledges that
criminal behavior is not always the result of a culpable mind, but is
sometimes the result of an interaction between the individual and his
environment. By limiting the amount of pressure and temptation that
undercover agents may bring to bear on a target, the defense
recognizes that the ordinary, law-abiding citizen can be persuaded,
cajoled, or intimidated into criminal activity that, he would never

*
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interference.

Appropriate

application of the defense requires, however, that courts be able to
accurately separate the truly wicked from the merely weak-willed, and
offensively coercive police conduct from that which merely convinces
the criminal-minded to commit the crime

here and now where he can

more easily be caught. Two methods of making these distinctions have
evolved: the subjective and objective tests.
In

1932, the Supreme Court first recognized the defense of

entrapment in

Sorrells v. United States,1 creating what has since come

to be known as the "subjective test." The test has two elements:
inducement and predisposition. The defendant must first provide
evidence that the government induced him into committing the crime.2
The inducement element focuses on the egregiousness of the pressure
that the government brought to bear on the defendant. Although the
degree of pressure required to establish inducement varies somewhat
between courts, the element is generally satisfied where the police
created a situation that posed a substantial risk that a hypothetical
"ordinary law-abiding person" might be tempted to break the law.3
The Seventh Circuit has characterized the test for inducement as
"whether the police employed tactics calculated to overcome the
reluctance of a law-abiding citizen."4 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit
describes

inducement

as

government

action

that

"'created

a

substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person other
than one ready to commit it. "'5 Because it emphasizes the reaction of
an ordinary or

reasonable

citizen

to

police-created

temptation,

inducement is an objective inquiry.6
Once the defendant presents some evidence that the government
did more than merely provide an opportunity to commit the crime that is, offered some extra incentive for it - the burden shifts to the
prosecution

to

rebut

the defense by

either

proving

beyond

a

1. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Hanson, 339 F.3d 983, 988 (D.C. Cir. 2003); United States v.
R yan, 289 F.3d 1339, 1343 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2002).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 924 F.2d 714, 717 (7th Cir. 1991) (describing
inducement as "the sorts of promises that would blind the ordinary person to his legal
duties" ); United States v. Andrews, 765 F.2d 1491 , 1499 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (holding that
inducement occurs when the government created a substantial risk that the offense would be
committed by someone "' other than one ready to commit it"'); United States v. Kell y, 748
F.2d 691, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Indu cement focuses on whether the government' s conduct
could have caused an undisposed person to commit a crime."); United States v. Dickens, 524
F.2d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 1975) (describing inducement as when '"the Government' s condu ct
created a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person other than one
ready to commit it"' ); PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 60 (3d ed. 200 2).
4. Evans, 924 F.2d at 717.
5. Andrews, 765 F.2d at 1499 (quoting Dickens, 524 F.2d at 444).
6. Kelly, 748 F.2d at 698.
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reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit the
crime or that he was not induced.7 The predisposition element shifts
the focus from how the police conduct would influence the ordinary
person to whether this particular defendant would have committed an
offense of the type charged in the absence of police inducement.8 If
the defendant is predisposed to commit the crime, the defense fails.
Accordingly, predisposition reduces to a question of "but-for"
causation, looking to whether the defendant would have committed a
crime but for the police pressure.9 Making this determination requires
a prediction of how the defendant would have behaved had the police
left him alone.10
The two elements thereby serve competing ends. The inducement
inquiry, by requiring the prediction of an ordinary person's behavior
with police pressure, binds police tactics within a range that will not
cause ordinary citizens to break the law. The predisposition inquiry,
by allowing conviction notwithstanding the degree of inducement,
prevents the would-be criminal from escaping liability for a crime that
would likely have happened in any event. It therefore requires
predicting

this defendant's behavior without police pressure.1 1

7. See, e.g., United States v . Hanson, 339 F.3d 983, 988 (D.C. Cir. 200 3 ); United States v.
Tom, 330 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 200 3).
8. MARCUS, supra note 3, at 63; Christopher D. Moore, Comment, The Elusive
Foundation of the Entrapment Defense, 89 Nw. U. L. R EV. 1151, 1 1 64 (1995) (arguing that
the Court's current position on predisposition asks "whether the defendant would have
committed the crime absent government involvement" ).
9. See Sorrell s v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1932) (stating that entrapment
prevents the punishment of a defendant "for the commission of an offense of the li ke of
which he had never been guilty, either in thought or in deed, and evidently never would have
been guilty of if the officers of the law had not inspired . . . him to attempt to commit it" );
United States v. Manzell a, 791 F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir. 1986) ("As a defense to a criminal
prosecution ' entrapment' means the government's inducing a person to commit a crime who
was not predisposed to commit it - in other words, who would not have committed it but
for the particular inducement that the government held out." ); MARCUS, supra note 3, at 63;
John D. Lombardo, Comment, Causation and "Objective" Entrapment: Toward a
Culpability-Centered Approach, 43 UCLA L. R EV. 20 9, 235 (1995).
10. See United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1 196, 120 1-0 2 (7th Cir. 1994) (en bane ).
In Hollingsworth, the court found entrapment as a matter of law where, despite his
willingness when given the opportunity to launder money, the defendant lacked
predisposition to commit the charged offense because, without the government' s assistance,
he never would have had the opportunity to do so. Id. at 120 2 ("(The defendants] had no
prayer of becoming launderers without the government' s aid." ).

1 1. See Phillip Mullock, The Logic of Entrapment, 46 U. PITI . L. REV. 739, 745 (1985)
("(T]o say that (the defendant] is disposed (to violate the statute] is to say that if a suitable
opportunity presents itself, (the defendant] will probably [violate the statute]." ). Others have
erroneously claimed that a defendant is predisposed so long as under some circumstance he
was willing to commit the crime. See R onald J. Al len et al., Clarifying Entrapment, 89 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 40 7, 413 (1999) (arguing that predisposition, as applied by some
courts, is "an ex istential fallacy" because everyone has a price at which they will commit a
crime); Jonathan C. Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the Entrapment
Defense, 73 VA. L. R EV. 10 1 1 , 10 40 (1987) (making the same argument). This reading of
predisposition is circular. The jury knows the defendant has a price because they know he
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Many states have rejected the subjective test and adopted what has
become known as the "objective test."12 The objective test forgoes any
inquiry into the defendant's predisposition, and merely asks whether
the police conduct posed a substantial risk that the crime would be
committed by someone otherwise not ready to do so.13 This focus on
police conduct is essentially the inducement inquiry of the subjective
test.14 Some states also require that the defendant prove a causal
connection between the improper police conduct and the commission
of the crime.15 While the subjective test almost always leaves the
question of entrapment to the jury, in most states employing the
objective test, the question is exclusively for the judge.16
Although accurate statistical evidence of the frequency with which
the entrapment defense succeeds is difficult to come by, anecdotal
evidence suggests that it is seldom successful. One survey of practicing
criminal defense attorneys described it as "judicially unpopular,"17 best
used only "in desperate circumstances,"18 or "in a few cases with ideal

commi tted the offense. The relevant question is what is the defendant's price in relation to
the unmanipulated world? Because entrapment is concerned with preventing the police fr om
manufactur ing crime that would not otherwise occur, the best reading of the doctrine is that
the predisposed is one who would have committed the crime under the ordinary
circumstances of his daily life. The predisposed is, ther efore, not one who would commit the
crime in ex change for some extraordinarily high price, but one who would do so when
provided with the incentives available in his ordinary environment.
12. B ecause the entrapment defense is based on a presumed congressional intent that
criminal statutes were not meant to reach acts instigated by the government, state courts are
free to adopt other versions of the defe nse in interpreting their own state law. See Sherman
v. Uni ted States, 356 U.S. 369, 379- 82 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sorrell s v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435, 446- 5 1 (1932).
13. State v. Agrabante, 830 P.2d 492, 499 (Haw. 1992);Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226,
229 (Alaska 1969}; MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1985).
14. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1985) (describing the obj ective test for
entrapment as when a police officer induces the defendant by "employing methods of
persuasion or inducement that create a substantial r isk that [the] offense will be committed
by persons other than those who are ready to commit it" ), with United States v. Andrews,
765 F.2d 1491, 1499 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (holding that inducement occurs under the subj ective
test when the government created a substantial r isk that the offense would be committed by
someone "other than one ready to commit it" ), and sources cited supra note 3.
15. See , e.g., Municipality of Anchorage v. Flanagan, 649 P.2d 957, 961 (Alaska Ct. App.
1982) (holding that the obj ective defense of entrapment was not available where the
inducement did not cause the defendant' s crime); People v. Barker, 293 N.W.2d 787, 788
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980 ) ("Defendant's selling of stolen property occurred after the breaking
and entering for which he was charged. Thus, it cannot rationally be argued that the
subsequent police conduct caused defendant's prior offense. Defendant was not charged
with any offenses arising out of the police sale, therefore, there was no possible
entrapment."), rev'd on other grounds, 30 6 N.W.2d 100 (Mich. 1981); see also Lombardo,
supra note 9, at 238-40 .
16. MARCUS, supra note 3, at 247; e.g., State v. Valdez- Molina, 897 P.2d 993, 995 (Idaho
1995); People v. D'Angelo, 257 N.W.2d 655 (Mich. 1977); Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226,
230 (Alaska 1969} .
17. Ben A. Hardy, The Traps of Entrapment, 3 AM. J. CRIM. L. 165, 189 ( 1974).
18. Id. at 165.
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facts," where "plea bargaining has proved unsuccessful, "19 and "no
other defense is possible."20 Another survey of State's Attorneys in
Chicago reveals a perception that in narcotics sales cases where the
defendant pleads entrapment, "the jury will convict almost every
time. "21 The author of one police manual on the execution of sting
operations states that he has "never, in hundreds of cases, ever lost
one to entrapment," and that in all the sting operations he has studied,
he has "not heard of a single case being lost to a defense of
entrapment. "22
Absent information concerning how frequently the entrapment
defense

should be successful, statistics on how often it is successful

provide little guidance. If we are confident that the police are not
placing undue pressure on the targets of sting operations, then the
defense should seldom succeed. But one study of police training
manuals

finds

that

they

contain

no

"significant

discussions

of

[entrapment]. "23 The discussion that does exist is lacking in meaningful
advice to the practicing police officer.24 This dearth of meaningful
training on entrapment, the authors conclude, is because the concept
is not a significant limitation on police practices.25
Two explanations for the defense's ineffectiveness have been
widely offered. First, for entrapment to be credibly argued, the
criminal act must be admitted.26 While a defendant can, in theory, both
deny committing the criminal act and plead entrapment, such a
strategy destroys the defendant's credibility.27 Even when the police
admit actions that are plausibly inducing, a defendant may elect to
forgo pleading entrapment and instead deny committing the offense.
Second, the subjective form of the defense invites the prosecution to
introduce

a

variety

of

evidence

relevant

to

the

defendant's

predisposition such as his criminal record; prior bad acts, including
uncharged crimes; and reputation testimony, which would otherwise

19. Id. at 165.
20. Id. at 165, 189.
21. David P. Bancroft, Comment, Administration of the Affirmative Trap and Doctrine
of Entrapment: Device and Defense, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 162 (1963); see also Roger Park,
The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 267 n.339 (1976) (describing an
informal survey of Minnesota criminal attorneys and their experience with the entrapment
defense).
22. STEVEN K. FRAZIER, THE STING BOOK 137 (1994).
23. LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY ET AL., DETECTION OF CRIME 2 1 1 (1976).
24. Id.
25. Id. Members of a vice squad of the Chicago Police Department informed the authors
that entrapment was "not treated formally or informally as a problem of concern." Id. at
211 n.18.
26. See Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 67 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
27. Id.
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evidence.28 The introduction

of this,

evidence is often criticized because it invites the jury to convict based
on the defendant's bad character or uncharged bad acts, even if they
are not convinced that he was predisposed to commit the offense.29
This Note argues that there is another reason entrapment claims
seldom succeed: the entrapment defense requires that factfinders
make causal and predictive determinations that human beings are
unable to make with accuracy, and the inherent inaccuracy works to
the defendant's disadvantage. The entrapment defense suffers from
what has been called "the

fundamental attribution error" - a

pervasive bias to see people as causal agents in their environment.30
Studies in social psychology demonstrate that people consistently
overestimate the role of dispositions and underestimate the role of the
situation when making predictions about what a particular defendant
or an ordinary person would do in a given situation - the sorts of
inquiries that an entrapment defense requires. Compounding the
problem, people consistently overestimate the accuracy with which
they can make these sorts of predictions, thereby depriving the
defendant of the benefit of the reasonable doubt. The effect of these
inaccuracies is to consistently impair the efficacy of the defense.31
This Note relies on studies in social psychology to argue that the
ineffectiveness

of the entrapment defense can be explained by

commonly held cognitive biases that sway the jury toward conviction.
Part I argues that the fundamental

attribution error biases the

factfinding in entrapment cases against the defendant. Studies in social
psychology reveal that factfinders do a consistently poor job of
determining what types of situations are inducing, that they are prone
to infer dispositions from manifestly situational behavior, and are
consistently overconfident in their ability to make such findings
accurately. Part II proposes several methods for mitigating the effects

28. Compare FED. R. EVID. 404( a) ( "Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible f or the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion . . . . ), with Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 ( 1932) ( " [I]f the
defendant seeks acquittal by reason of entrapment he cannot complain of an appropriate
and searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition as bearing upon that issue.").
See generally W.H. Johnson, III, Note, Proving a Criminal Predisposition: Separating the
Unwary Innocent from the Unwary Criminal, 43 DUKE L .J. 384 ( 1993).
"

29. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 ( 1958) ( Franklin, J., concurring).
30. See generally L EE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE
SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ( 1991) ( discussing the fundamental
attribution error).
31. For an interesting argument that the fundamental attribution error has produced a
systemic tendency within the substantive criminal law to find criminal culpability when harm
occurs, see Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the
Social Psychology of Blame , 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383 ( 2003). This Note, however, takes a less
novel approach, ex amining solely the fundamental attribution error's effect on factfi nding,
and not how it has shaped legal doctrine.

765

Psychology, Factfinding, and Entrapment

February 2005]

of the fundamental attribution error: improving jury instructions,
adopting the objective test for entrapment as a jury question, and
increasing police and judicial sensitivity toward the use of channel
factors32 in sting operations.
I.

ATIRIBUTION THEORY & ENTRAPMENT

Implicit in both the entrapment defense and classic attribution
theory is the understanding that behavior is produced by a
combination

of an
individual's
personal
characteristics
{his
disposition) and his environment (the situation). All of an individual's
actions fall along a causal spectrum. On one end lie those actions that
are completely situational - under the circumstances, anybody would
have behaved the same way.33 At the other lie those actions that,
under the circumstances, differ from those that most people would
take under the same circumstances. We attribute this deviation from
the norm to the unique disposition of the actor.34 Relative to the
ordinary man, the actor had a "preference for" or a "disposition
toward" the particular act.
Determining where on this causal spectrum any one person's
particular action lies is a highly inaccurate task. Social psychology
teaches

that the attribution

of causality between

situation and

disposition is biased by the fundamental attribution error, which
results

in

causal

attributions

that

lean

excessively

toward

the

dispositional end of the spectrum.35 In other words, "in a social setting
in which either a person or some situational variable is a plausible
causal candidate for an outcome, there exists a general bias to see
people as causal agents, particularly their enduring dispositional

32. A channel factor is a very small situational difference that produces surprisingly
large changes in behavior. See discussion infra Part I, Section D.
33. See Harold H. Kelley , Attribution Theory in Social Psychology, in 15 NEBRASKA
192, 208-09 (David Levine ed., 1967) ("[T]he action yields
information about the actor's idiosyncratic intentions only insofar as the effects are not those
that people in general would have produced under similar circumstances. "); Richard E.
Nisbett & Eugene Borgida, Attribution and the Psychology of Prediction, 32 J. PERSONALITY
& Soc. PSYCHOL. 932, 932 (1975) ("[T]he stimulus rather than the actor will be seen as the
chief cause . . . when most people respond to the entity in the same way the actor does. ").
SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION,

34. See Edward E. Jones

&

EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1

Victor
(1967).

A.

Harris, The Attribution of Attitudes, 3 J.

35. See generally RICHARD E. NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980); Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist
and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process, in 10 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 173 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1977); Edward E. Jones
& Richard E. Nisbett, The Actor and the Observer: Divergent Perceptions of the Causes of
Behavior, in ATTRIBUTION: PERCEIVING THE CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR 79 (Edward E. Jones

et al. eds. , 1971); Edward E. Jones, The Rocky Road from Acts to Dispositions, 34
(1979).

PSYCHOLOGIST 107

AM.
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attributes."36 This is not to say that disposition is not a determinant of
behavior, but merely that it is often less so than is commonly believed.
The fundamental attribution error has two components: First, people
have an inflated belief in the importance of individual character
differences and dispositions.37 Second, they underestimate the degree
to which situational factors influence behavior.38
The fundamental attribution error poses a particular threat to the
entrapment defense because the defense requires the factfinder to
separate the situational and dispositional causes of behavior. Section
I.A argues that factfinders have a difficult time determining when an
ordinary person would be tempted by a sting operation. Determining
whether a situation is inducing requires predicting how the ordinary
person would respond to the police sting. Numerous studies suggest,
however, that people consistently underestimate how easily behavior
can be manipulated by situational factors.
Section I.B argues that a factfinder may have similar difficulty in
determining whether a defendant is predisposed to a particular crime.
This element of the defense requires the factfinder to consider a
variety of character evidence and determine whether the defendant
was the sort of person who was likely to commit the offense anyway.
This is akin to predicting the likelihood that the defendant would
commit the crime even if he had never wandered into the police sting
operation. Studies suggest, however, that even when given reliable
character evidence, people do a very poor job of predicting how others
will behave.
Section
produces

l.C contends that

overly

the fundamental

confident factual findings in

attribution error
entrapment cases.

Factfinders are more confident in their ability to identify dispositions
and predict how the ordinary person will respond to a particular
situation than their performance warrants. This overconfidence works
to the defendant's disadvantage by depriving him of the benefit of the
reasonable doubt.
Finally, Section l.D discusses the use of channel factors in sting
operations.

Social psychology provides a variety of methods of

designing sting operations that have the tendency to produce drastic
changes in behavior through subtle situational manipulation. Those
manipulations that are particularly difficult for factfinders to account

36. Shelley E. Taylor, The A vailability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction, in
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 190, 192-93 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). For further discussion and an historical background of the
fundamental attribution error, see Daniel T. Gilbert & Patrick S. Malone, The
Correspondence Bias, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 21 (1995).
JUDGMENT

37. LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETT,
PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 4 (1991).
38. Id.

THE

PERSON
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and pose a particular threat to the

entrapment defense.
A.

Discounting the Situation and the Difficulty in Determining What
Is "Inducement"

When the factfinder is required to determine whether the
defendant was induced into committing a crime, it must decide
whether the police created a situation that would potentially cause a
law-abiding citizen to break the law.39 This exercise is really a form of
prediction: the factfinder imagines a hypothetical reasonable person
and predicts how he would respond to a given police inducement.
Studies in social psychology demonstrate, however, that subjects often
highly underestimate the degree to which the ordinary person's
behavior can be altered by subtle situational manipulations.40 This
substantially decreases the likelihood that a judge or jury will find that
police pressure was sufficient to cause a reasonable person to deviate
from his ordinary law-abiding ways. Instead, because it has excessively
discounted situational factors as causes for the crime, the factfinder is
overly likely to attribute the crime in question to a criminal disposition
possessed by the defendant.
In a groundbreaking study, John Darley and Daniel Batson
explored the degree to which personal disposition and situational
factors determine behavior through an experimental-recreation of the
parable of the Good Samaritan.41 The subjects of the experiment were
Princeton University theological seminary students.42 In the first stage,
each subject was given a questionnaire to complete regarding the
reasons for their decision to attend the seminary.43 Specifically, the

39. See sources cited supra note 3 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Walter Mischel & Philip K. Peake, Beyond Deja Vu in the Search for Cross
Situational Consistency, 89 PSYCHOL. REV. 730 , 730 (1982) ("[C]ompelling intuitive evidence

supports the enduring conviction that people are characterized by broad dispositions
revealed in extensive cross-situational consistency. ").
41. John M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, From Jerusalem to Jericho: A Study of
Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior, 27 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 100 (1973). The parable of the Good Samaritan is as follows:

"And who is my neighbor?" Jesus replied, "A man was going down from Jerusalem to
Jericho, and he fell among robbers, who stripped him and beat him, and departed, leaving
him half dead. Now by chance a priest was going down the road; and when he saw him he
passed by on the other side. So likewise a Levite, when he came to the place and saw him,
passed by on the other side. But a Samaritan, as he journeyed, came to where he was; and
when he saw him, he had compassion, and went to him and bound his wounds .. . . Which of
these three, do you think, proved neighbor to him who fell among the robbers?"
Luke 10:29-36 (RSV).
42. Darley
43. Id.

&

Batson, supra note 41, at 102.
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researchers requested that the subject identify a dispositional trait that
best explained the motivation for his religious training.44 In Stage II,
each subject was individually instructed to prepare a short talk to be
presented in a nearby building.45 After being given directions to the
building, one-third of the subjects were told, "'Oh, you're late. They
were expecting you a few minutes ago. . . . [Y]ou'd better hurry;"'
another third were told, "'[They're] ready for you, so please go right
over;"' and the last third were told, '"It'll be a few minutes before
they're ready for you, but you might as well head on over."'46 On the
way, while passing through an alley, the participants encountered a
man slumped in a doorway, coughing and groaning.47 The subjects
were given scores according to how much assistance, if any, they
offered to the apparently sick man.48
Darley and Batson discovered that they could manipulate how
most seminarians reacted to the sick man by varying the degree of
time-pressure they were under. While 63 percent of early seminarians,

and 45 percent of the on-time seminarians stopped to help, only 10
percent of the late seminarians were helpful.49 The dispositional
variable - the nature of the participant's religious orientation - had

no statistically significant effect.50 Because most seminarians did not
help when they were hurried, but few did when hurried, Darley and
Batson were able to "induce" either helpful or unhelpful behavior by
altering the situational manipulation.
Observers of the Good Samaritan experiment were not, however,
able to easily perceive the true causes of the seminarians' behavior.
Expanding on the Good Samaritan study, Paula Pietromonaco and
Richard Nisbett provided half of their subjects with a copy of Darley
and Batson's results to read.51 The researchers then asked all of the
subjects

to

make

predictions

about

helping

behavior

in

two

situations.52 One situation, very similar to the Good Samaritan study,

44. Id. at 103. The three possible motivations for their training were: a) a means to
another end such as salvation; b) religion as an end in itself; or c) religion as a quest for
meaning in the world. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 103-04.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 105.
50. Id. at 106 ("No correlation between the various measures of religiosity and [the
occurrence of helping behavior] ever came near statistical significance . . . . ).
"

51. Paula R. Pietromonaco & Richard E. Nisbett, Swimming Upstream Against the
Fundamental Attribution Error: Subjects' Weak Generalizations from the Darley and Batson
Study, 10 SOC. BEHA V. & PERSONALITY l, 2 (1982).
52. Id.
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involved a woman with an injury requesting assistance.53 The second
was a pregnant woman whose car had broken down.54 Each subject
then estimated the likelihood that the average member of the target
population would help.55 Before answering, those who had received
the Good Samaritan study were asked to recall and consider it.56
The subjects demonstrated a poor grasp of what causes a person to
help another. For those subjects who had not read the

Good

Samaritan study, the estimates regarding which seminarians would
help were virtually the opposite of reality. Uninformed subjects
believed that being in a hurry would have virtually no effect on the
decision, and predicted that about

80

percent of seminarians in both

the hurried and unhurried groups would stop to help.57 The
uninformed subjects also erroneously believed that religious
disposition would have a pronounced effect, producing nearly an
eighteen-percentage point difference in the proportion of seminarians
offering

help.58

The

results

suggest

that

the

observers

of

this

experiment are inclined to attribute helping behavior to dispositional
qualities of the actors and not to salient situational factors. Although
the primary determinant of helping behavior was whether or not the
experimenters "induced" the seminarian into not helping by hurrying
him, observers believed that this factor would be irrelevant. Instead,
they placed great emphasis on what turned out to be the statistically
insignificant religious disposition of the seminarian.
This tendency is especially resilient to remedial efforts. Even those
subjects who had read and been instructed to recall the Good
Samaritan study fared poorly. They were no less likely to use religious
motivation as a factor in predicting when seminarians would help than
the uninformed subjects.59 In addition, while Darley and Batson had
demonstrated a fifty-three percentage point difference in helping rates
between hurried and unhurried groups, the estimates of the informed
subjects regarding which seminarians would help only showed a
nineteen point difference.60 The researchers concluded that "the
failure of subjects to generalize even to a highly similar situation,

53. Id.

54. Id.
55. For example, subjects were asked, "'What percentage of the seminary students
would help?'" or "'What percentage of New Jersey males would help?"' Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 3 tbl.1.
58. Id. at 3.
59. Id. ("No interaction effects were obtained between the effect of being informed and
personality type or for any interactions including these two variables. Thus, informed
subjects continued to use the personality variable for predictions and were not significantly
less inclined to do so than uninformed subjects.").
60. Id. at 3 tbl. 1.
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despite the presence of what was surely a very strong experimental
demand to do so, suggests that the fundamental attribution error may
be quite resistant to the data and arguments of the social scientist."61
Like the subjects of these studies, the factfinder in an entrapment
case is presented with situational and dispositional data and required
to determine the cause of a particular behavior. Factfinders must first
determine how a reasonable person would respond to the police sting
operation. Second, given the evidence concerning the defendant's
character and disposition, the factfinder must decide whether the
crime would have occurred even absent the inducement. What these
studies suggest for the entrapment defense is that judges and juries
may perform quite poorly at these tasks. The drastic behavioral effects
produced by subtle situational manipulations may go unnoticed.
Instead, factfinders may overestimate the probative value of the more
salient propensity evidence and explain the defendant's behavior as a
product of a criminal disposition. These studies suggest, however, that
dispositional evidence is a much less valuable means of determining
the cause of behavior than the average judge or jury is likely to realize.
The results

of Darley & Batson's study might plausibly be

explained by overconfidence in the accuracy of the seminarian's self
reported,

dispositional

evidence.

In

an

entrapment

case,

the

defendant's disposition will likely be proven in part through the
testimony of character witnesses.62 One might plausibly hope that the
opinions of others would provide a more accurate assessment of an
actor's disposition than potentially self-serving self-reports, thereby
improving

the

accuracy

of

predictions

relying

on

dispositional

evidence. The fundamental attribution error has, however, been
demonstrated to be a robust phenomenon even when dispositional
evidence is derived from a more objective source.
Newton, Griffin and Ross gave two groups of subjects the chance
to donate to a food drive.63 Subjects were ranked by their peers
according to the likelihood that they would donate to a food drive.64
Those voted "least likely" were placed in one group; those voted
"most likely" in another.65 Half of the subjects in each group were sent
both a letter personally addressed to them requesting that they donate
and a map showing the location of the collection box, and they

61. Id. at 4.
62. Thomas J. Reed, The Character Evidence Defense: Acquittal Based on Good
Character, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 345, 392-93 (1997).
63. Ross & NISBETT, supra note 30, at 132-33 (describing E. Newton et al., Actual
Versus Estimated Impact of Person and Situation in Determining Pro-Social Behavior
(1988) (unpublished Manuscript, on file with Stanford University).
64. Id. at 132.

65. Id.
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received follow-up phone call reminding them to donate.66 The other
half of each group was merely given a form letter addressed to "Dear
Student," requesting that they donate.67
The peers who had nominated each subject to his "least likely" or
"most likely" group were then asked to predict whether the subject
would donate, given the situational group he was placed in.68 The
nominators strongly believed that the disposition of the subject would
be predictive of donation, but that the situational group he was placed
in would be largely irrelevant.69 Specifically, they estimated that a vast
majority of the "most likely" contributors, but only a small minority of
the "least likely" contributors, would donate.70 These predictions did
not substantially vary depending on whether the subject would receive
a map, phone call, and personalized letter, or merely a form letter.71
It was, however, the situation that proved a stronger determinant
of behavior than a person's perceived disposition to donate. None of
the "least likely" subjects and only

8

percent of the "most likelies"

who received only the form letter donated to the drive,72 but 25
percent of the "least likelies" and 42 percent of the "most likelies"
donated when they received the map, personalized letter, and follow
up phone call.73 While the study revealed that both disposition and
situation are important factors in predicting a person's behavior, the
situational variable, at least in this instance, proved more important
than any character trait salient to his peers.74
Even when given character evidence provided by the actor's peers,
subjects in the donation study performed poorly at determining when
a peer would be "induced" into donating and when he would do so

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 133.
69. Id.
70. The nominat ors predicted likelihoods of 83% for t hose who received t he phone call,
personalized letter, and map, and an 80% likelihood for t hose t hat received only the form
lett er. Id. The subject s predict ed t hat t he "least likely" cont ribut ors would have a 17%
likelihood of donat ing when t hey received t he map, personalized lett er, and follow-up phone
call, and a 16% likelihood of donat ing where t hey only received t he form lett er. Id.
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Ross and Nisbett concluded:

The evidence, in fact , is consist ent wit h an ext reme version of t he fundament al att ribut ion
error. Peop le readily make trait ascript ions fr om data that p ermit only a situat ional
interp ret at ion or, at most , t he interp ret at ion t hat t hat the actor behaves in a p art icular way
in a p art icular typ e of sit uat ion. These trait ascriptions are t hen used as the basis for yet
furt her p redictions, which, again are characterized by litt le attent ion to sit uat ional factors.
Id.
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due to his own disposition. Predictors were able to somewhat separate
those of their peers who had donating disposition from those who did
not, but they overestimated the role that disposition would have in
their peer's decision. Similarly, predictors weakly perceived that
receiving a personalized letter, phone call, and map were situational
variables that would have some effect on the likelihood of donation,
but they vastly underestimated their role in the experiment's outcome.
Extrapolating from studies of helping behavior to the realm of
crime prevention is, of course, fraught with uncertainty. While it may
be fairly easy to induce an ordinary person into donating to a can
drive, producing the sort of antisocial theft and drug offenses typically
targeted by sting operations may not be as easy. It may seem that
criminal activity is so beyond the realm of an ordinary person's typical
behavior that the sort of subtle situational manipulations that had such
drastic effects in these studies would be ineffectual at instigating
crime. Instead, the more that crime deviates from the person's
ordinary behavior, the more drastic and obvious the inducement might
have to be.
As intuitive as this argument may be, one of the most famous
studies in social psychology, Stanley Milgram's

Behavioral Study of
Obedience, refutes it.75 Milgram's subjects were instructed that they

were participating in a study of memory and learning.76 They were
partnered with one of

Milgram's accomplices,

masquerading as

another subject.77 In what appeared to be a random manner, subjects
were assigned to the role of teacher, and accomplices to the role of
learner.78 Accomplice and subject were taken to a room where the
learner was strapped into an electric chair.79 The teacher was then
taken to the shock generator in an adjoining room connected via an
intercom.80 The teacher was instructed to ask the learner a series of
memory questions.81 Each time the learner answered one incorrectly,
the teacher was to press a button to administer a shock and then turn a
dial to increase the voltage for the next wrong answer.82 Once the

75. Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J.

ABNORMAL &

Soc.

PSYCHOL. 371 (1963) [hereinafter Milgram, Behavioral Study]; see a/so STANLEY MILGRAM,
OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1974) (hereinafter MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY];
Stanley Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority, 18 HUM.
REL. 57 (1965) [hereinafter Milgram, Some Conditions].

76. Milgram , Behavioral Study, supra note 75, at 372.
77. Id. at 373.
78. Id.
79. Id. At this point, the teacher was given a 45 volt sample shock to convince him of the
authenticity of the experiment. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 373-74.

February 2005]

Psychology, Factfinding, and Entrapment

shock reached the level of

300 volts, the

773

learner began to bang on the

adjoining wall.s3 The pounding was repeated after a

3 15

volt shock was

administered, and the learner ceased to respond either to questions or
further shocks after that.84 If the teacher continued asking questions,
the learner ceased to respond, and the teacher was instructed to treat
no answer as a wrong answer.s5 The experiment ended either when the
teacher refused to continue or when he administered the maximum
shock of

450 volts, two steps beyond the level

labeled "Danger: Severe

Shock."s6

Milgram sought to discover what portion of teachers would call a
halt to the experiment and refuse to continue administering shocks to
a non-responsive learner. The results of the study were startling. Only
one in eight subjects refused to continue administering shocks after
the learner began banging on the wall,s7 and in total, 35 percent at
some time refused to continue shocks.ss But 65 percent never refused
to comply, administering ten more shocks of increasing intensity after

the learner began banging on the wall and eight more shocks after he
stopped responding at all.s9 With few exceptions, the teachers believed
the shocks they administered were real and painful.90 Many fully
obedient teachers orally protested, but continued with the experiment
when the researcher accepted responsibility and instructed them to
continue.91
Anticipating that the results might be counterintuitive, Milgram
measured the difference between commonly expected obedience and
actual obedience. Prior to conducting

the

experiment, Milgram

83. Id. at 374.
84. Id.

85. Id.
86. See id. at 372, 376.
87. Id. at 375.
88. Id.
89. Id. The maximum shock that these subjects administered was two notches beyond
where the dial was labeled "Danger: Severe Shock." Id. at 376.
90. Id. at 375.
91. See MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY, supra note 75, at 153-68; Milgram,
Some Conditions, supra note 75, at 67. Milgram repeated the study several more times under
different conditions. See MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY, supra note 75; Milgram,
Some Conditions, supra note 75. In one variation, Milgram placed the learner in the same
room as the teacher. Milgram, Some Conditions, supra note 75, at 62. In this version, the
learner would only receive a shock if his hand was pressed against a metal plate on the arm
of the electric chair. Id. At the 150-volt level, the learner demanded to be let free and
refused to place his hand on the shock-plate. Id. The experimenter ordered the teacher to
force the learner's hand onto the plate and administer the remaining shocks. At 300 volts the
learner refused to answer any more questions and insisted he was no longer a willing
participant. Id. at 60. Even under these conditions, 30 percent of the teachers completed the
entire experiment. Id. at 62.
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distributed a description of the proposed study and a questionnaire to
fourteen Yale senior psychology majors.92 They were asked to reflect
on the study and predict the behavior of

100

hypothetical teachers.93

All fourteen senior psychology students agreed that only a small
minority of teachers would continue to the maximum level of shock.94
The estimates ranged only from 0 percent to 3 percent.95 Milgram
posed the same question to his colleagues, and "the most general

feeling was that few if any subjects would go beyond the designation
Very Strong Shock."96 The prediction of forty psychiatrists surveyed
by Milgram was that only 3.73 percent of teachers would continue
after the learner began pounding on the wall, and a mere one-tenth of

1 percent of subjects would

administer the maximum level of shock.97

Milgram's experiment suggests that most ordinary, reasonable
people can be induced into committing acts that, had circumstances
been as the subjects believed, would be criminal. Moreover, Milgram
was able to induce this behavior through situational manipulations
that

few

professional

psychologists

and

psychology

students -

presumably a group well-equipped to identify inducement - could
accurately

evaluate.

Clearly,

however,

Milgram's teachers

were

induced into shocking the learner. The experiment went beyond
posing a substantial risk that an ordinary person would administer the
series of shocks; it produced a situation in which nearly two-thirds did!
Assuming for the moment that Milgram was a government agent and
the teacher was charged with an offense related to the shocks, no jury
could rationally conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that there was
no inducement. Yet the predictions of Milgram's colleagues and
students suggest that hardly any judge or jury would find that such a
defendant was induced. Instead, most courts would likely hold that the
experimental design failed to do more than merely provide an
"opportunity" to commit the offense and is therefore insufficient to
even raise the issue of entrapment.98

92. Milgram, Behavioral Study, supra note 75, at 375.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Milgram, Some Conditions, supra note 75, at 72-73 & fig.3.
98. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932) ("It is well settled that the fact
that officers or employees of the government merely afford opportunities or facilities for the
commission of the offense does not defeat the prosecution. ").
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Inferring Disposition from Situational Behavior and the Difficulty
in Determining Who ls "Predisposed"
The flipside of the propensity to underestimate the role that

situational variables play in

determining behavior is that

when

behavior is observed, the observer is too likely to infer that the actor
possesses
a
corresponding
character
trait.99
When
people
underestimate the power of situations, they will be prone to make
unwarranted dispositional inferences about actors who violate the
erroneous expectations that such underestimates create.100 Observers
also fail to properly utilize knowledge of base rates - the proportion
of other people

who

behaved similarly - when making

their

dispositional attributions.101 Observers are not substantially less likely
to infer character traits from a person's behavior when they know that
most or all other people behaved similarly in the same situation.102
This phenomenon may undermine the factfinder's ability to
accurately determine the predisposition of the defendant in an
entrapment case. First, a factfinder may be excessively prone to infer
that the entrapped defendant was predisposed to commit the crime
based on his induced commission of the offense. Second, the factfinder
is likely to undervalue evidence that, given the degree of inducement,
most other people would also have committed the offense.

1.

Inferring Predisposition from Commission of the Offense

Studies in social psychology and about the fundamental attribution
error confirm a long-suspected pitfall of the entrapment defense:
factfinders may infer that the defendant was predisposed to commit
the offense merely from the fact that he did so in response to the
police inducement.103 The fact that he committed the crime is often the

99. Jones, supra note 35, at 113-16 (discussing the overattribution effect).
100. See generally Melvin Snyder & Edward E. Jones, Attitude Attribution When
Behavior ls Constrained, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 585 (1974) (providing
evidence that people tend to make dispositional attributions to explain behavior,
underestimating the role of environmental constraints).
101. See generally Nisbett & Borgida, supra note 33 (arguing that subjects do not make
use of base-rate information in making predictions).
102 Id.
103. See Bennett L . Gershman, Abscam, The J udiciary, and the Ethics of Entrapment, 91
L .J. 1565, 1581 (1982); Hardy, su; ra note 17 at 187 ("[O]ne of the most common
methods of proving a defendant's predisposition is by showing his ready complaisance to
commit the crime or, in effect, the speed and ease with which he complies with an agent's or
informant's request. ") Stephen A. Miller, Comment, The Case for Preserving the Outrageous
Government Conduct Defense, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 305, 329-30 (1996) ("Juries may infer
predisposition simply from a defendant's acceptance of government inducements. ");
Mullock, supra note 11, at 750 ("[I]f we ask, 'why did he do it?' the answer is, 'because he
was predisposed to do it;' and if we ask, 'why was he predisposed to do it?' the answer is,
'because he did it. "'). While a defendant can, in theory, both deny committing the crime and
YALE
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most obvious piece of evidence concerning the sort of person the
defendant is, and some courts have found this sufficient evidence from
which a jury can find predisposition.104 Commission of the offense in
the face of police inducement is, however, exceedingly minimal
evidence of predisposition, given that predisposition is a measure of
how the defendant would behave

in the absence of police inducement.

The circularity of this evidentiary bootstrapping is obvious when
identified, but studies suggest that it may nonetheless tempt
factfinders. The danger that the factfinder will be seduced by such a
pernicious argument is magnified by the fundamental attribution
error. In other words, to the same extent that the factfinder discounts
the situational factors in the inducement inquiry, it is likely to
overestimate the degree that the defendant's disposition played in his
offense.105
Richard Nisbett provided some of the clearest evidence of the
propensity to excessively infer dispositional traits from manifestly
situational behavior. Nisbett arranged to have some observer-subjects
("the observers") watch other actor-subjects ("the actors") participate
in what they were told was a study on decisionmaking.106 The
observers watched as an experimenter announced to the actors
awaiting the start of the experiment, "Before we get started, though, I
happen to have sort of a real decision for you to make."107 He told
them that volunteers were needed to provide

campus tours to

potential donors to the University on the upcoming weekend.108 If the
actor was willing to volunteer, she would be paid for her time. One
group of observers watched actors who were offered

$0.50

an hour,

argue that he was entrapped, Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988), this strategy is
rarely employed because the implication of inconsistency destroys the defendant's
credibility.See id. at 67 (Scalia, J., concurring).
104. See United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420, 1429 (6th Cir. 1994) (upholding the
district court's conclusion that a jury could find that the defendant was predisposed to
commit the alleged crime because she committed the crime); United States v. Jannotti, 673
F.2d 578, 598-99 (3d Cir. 1982) (allowing jury to infer a politician's predisposition to accept
bribes from his ready acceptance of the bribe in question); Maestas v. United States, 341
F.2d 493, 495 (10th Cir. 1965) (permitting a jury to find predisposition to sell narcotics from
willingness to sell to undercover agent); United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1242
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) ("It is not unfair to permit a jury to infer a defendant's mental state, his
predisposition, from the manner in which he responds to [the inducement].").
105. Consider, for example, the statement of Abscam informant Mel Weinberg that '"a
guy's either a crook or he isn't. If he ain't a crook, he ain't gonna do anything illegal no
matter what I offer him or tell him to do."' GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE
SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 120 (1988) (quoting Mel Weinberg).
106. Richard E. Nisbett et al., Behavior as Seen by the A ctor and as Seen by the
Observer, 27 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 154 (1973); see also Jones & Nisbett, supra
note 35 (discussing the study).
107. Nisbett et al., supra note 106, at 156.
108. Id.
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while another group of observers watched actors who were offered

$1.50

an hour.109 Only one-quarter of those offered

$0.50 volunteered,

while two-thirds of those offered the higher wage accepted.110 As
economic theory would predict, the wage, a situational factor, was a
good predictor of whether the employment offer would be accepted.
Both the actors and the observers were later asked to predict the
likelihood that the actor would volunteer to help another charitable
group, the United Fund, for free.111 Actors themselves did not think
they were more likely to help the United Fund if they were volunteers
than if they were nonvolunteers.112 Observers, however, believed that
if the actor had previously volunteered to give campus tours, she was
much more likely to volunteer to help the United Fund than those
who had not volunteered.113
Given that subjects were randomly assigned to the

$0.50

or

$1.50

group, there is little reason to think one group was more predisposed

to volunteering. In making their predictions, however, observers of the
high-volunteering, highly paid group judged them as generally being
more likely to volunteer in the future than did the observers of the
low-volunteering, poorly paid group.114 Observers apparently assumed
that the actor's decision to volunteer reflected a predisposition to
volunteer rather than the influence of the payment offered.115 When
the actors were asked to explain why they accepted the offers,
however, they were more likely to explain their behavior in terms of
the amount of money they were offered,116 suggesting that people are
much better at appreciating the situational causes of their own
behavior than those of others.
The only factor distinguishing those who accepted the offer and
those who did not was whether they were offered the higher or the
lower amount of money - i.e. the degree to which they were induced
to volunteer.117 But by predicting that actors would volunteer under
less compelling circumstances, observers revealed that they largely

109. Id. Adjusted for inflation, these figures would be approximately $2.07 and $6.22 in
2003 dollars. See Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator, at http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/bu2/
inflateCPI.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
110. Nisbett et al., supra note 106, at 157.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 157 tbl.l.
115. Id. at 157.
116. Id. ("It therefore appears that observers are inclined to make dispositional
inferences from behavior under circumstances in which actors infer nothing about their
general inclinations. ").
117. See id. at 157 tbl.l.
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attributed the decision to volunteer to whether or not the actor had a
volunteering disposition, and not the wage that he was offered.118 A
jury confronted with a defendant pleading entrapment is similarly
situated. The jury knows of an action - the crime - and a situation
the actor was in - the inducement. If the conclusions of the Nisbett
study hold true, the factfinder may infer a criminal predisposition from
the induced crime.
Observers are also likely to infer an actor's disposition even when
the actor is given no choice about his conduct. In a 1967 study, Edward
Jones and Victor Harris asked subjects to read essays that either
attacked or defended Castro's Cuba.119 One-half of the subjects were
told that the author of the piece had been assigned a particular
position to advocate for in a debate, with no choice on the author's
part.120 The other half were told that the author made his own choice
of whether the essay would be pro- or anti-Castro.121 The subjects were
then asked to estimate the author's actual opinion of Castro.122 Those
who were told that the authors were given a choice largely believed, as
expected, that those who wrote pro-Castro essays were truly pro
Castro and vice versa.123
The assessments of those readers who were told that the author of
their essay was given no choice, however, were quite surprising. Given
that the subjects were told that the author was randomly assigned the
editorial

position

for

which

he

advocated,

one

would

expect

approximately similar attitudinal assessments of both pro- and anti
Castro authors. The editorial position of the essay, in other words, was
irrelevant to the author's actual beliefs. Despite knowing that the
authors had no choice concerning the position for which they
advocated, this group of subjects judged the pro-Castro writers to be
more pro-Castro than the anti-Castro writers.124 The subjects gave
substantial weight to the "face-value" meaning of the act of writing the

118. Id. at 157 ("It may be seen . . . that the actor's behavior prompted the observers to
make dispositional inferences. ").
119. Jones & Harris, supra note 34.
120. Jones and Harris explained the instructions to the subject concerning the essay as

follows:
The essay was presented as the first draft of an opening statement in a college debate . . . .
We assumed that the subjects would realize that debaters often try to defend positions in
which they do not believe . . . . The choice-no choice manipulation was delivered orally: the
debater had either been directed by the team advisor to argue a specified side of the topic or
was given his choice of sides.
Id. at 8.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 4.
123. Id. at 6 tbl.l.
124. Id.
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essay, severely failing to discount its implications in light of the
obvious situational constraint.125
The study suggests that even when a person has been assigned or
coerced into a particular behavior, that behavior will be seen as
indicative of his particular disposition.126 The readers of the essay
knew that the writers had no choice about the editorial position of
their

essays - the writers were perfectly constrained.

Despite

knowing this, the subjects still believed that the editorial position of
the essay was indicative of the authors' beliefs.127 Extrapolated into a
courtroom setting, this suggests that even when the government
inducement is so great as to leave no room for a person not to commit
a crime, a jury is still likely to view the commission of the crime as
probative of a criminal disposition.
2.

Failure to Apply Knowledge of Base Rates

A postulate of classic attribution theory holds that causal
explanations for an actor's behavior are or should be influenced by
consensus information, i.e., information concerning how other people
responded to a similar situationY8 Situational factors are perceived as
the primary cause of behavior when most people behave similarly,
while the actor's unique disposition or preference is perceived as the
cause when his behavior is unique.129 Accordingly, we should expect
that when a particular actor's behavior was the modal response to a
particular inducement, that behavior is not highly probative of his
disposition. A substantial amount of research has demonstrated,

125. Id. at 22 ("[Subjects] give substantial weight to the intrinsic or 'face value' meaning
of the act itself in their attributions of attitude. This is true even when the act occurs in a no
choice context.").
126. Jones and Harris observed:
[C]orrespondence in attributing underlying attitudes to account for expressed opinions is
high when the opinions are unexpected and expressed in a context of free choice. However,
the content and direction of the opinions exert a clear inference on attribution even when
choice is drastically reduced. In a context that permits the target person some very minimal
degree of spontaneity, the perceiver seems to view his performance as more informative
than a rational analysis of act and context would suggest.
Id. at 23.

127. Id. at 22. Follow-up studies have confirmed and elaborated on Jones and Harris's
experiment. In one interesting formulation, experimenters asked subjects to rate how useful
they found the essay in judging the writer's attitudes. Even those subjects who described the
essay as "not useful" found the essay strongly probative of the writer's attitude. Arthur
Miller et al., The Perceived Value of Constrained Behavior: Pressures Toward Biased
Inference in the Attitude Attribution Paradigm, 47 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 160, 164 (1984). Other
studies confirm that subjects make the same inferences when they read essays actually
written by naive subjects assigned to a particular position. Snyder & Jones, supra note 100.
128. See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 33, at 208-09.
129. Id.
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however, that knowledge of consensus information produces very
weak effects on causal attributions.130
In

one

study

demonstrating

this

phenomenon,

researchers

described Milgram's obedience experiment to their subjectsY1 One
half of the subjects were also told the results - that

65

percent of

teachers administered the highest level of shock - while the other
half were not.132 Both sets of subjects were then asked to rate various
teachers who did or did not administer the maximum level of shock on
a variety of character traits.133 Subjects in both groups rated teachers
who administered all of the shocks as weaker, colder, maladjusted,
unattractive, unlikable, and more dependent than those who did not.134
Data suggesting that obedience was largely induced had little
bearing on the subjects' dispositional evaluations of the teachers.135
Those subjects who knew that a majority of teachers completed the
experiment did not substantially differ in the personality ratings they
assigned.136 Logically, being aware of this high base rate of obedience
should decrease the correspondence between the act of shocking and a
sadistic or aggressive disposition. In other words, if one knows that
two-thirds of people behave in the same unexpected manner, one
should be less prone to attribute dispositions as causes for such acts
than if one assumes the behavior was aberrational.137 But the results

130. See, e.g., Nisbett & Borgida, supra note 33; Amos Tversky
Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, 76 PSYCHOL. BULL. 105 (1971).

&

Daniel Kahneman,

131. Arthur G. Miller et al., Perception of Obedience to Authority, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 81ST ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, 127,
127-28 (1972) [hereinafter Miller et al., Perception]; see also Arthur G. Miller et al., The
Prediction and Perception of Obedience to Authority, 42 J. PERSONALITY 23 (1974)
[hereinafter Miller et al., Prediction].
132. Miller et al., Perception, supra note 131, at 127.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 127-28. Milgram similarly noted:
Many people, not knowing much about the experiment, claim that subjects who go to the
end of the board are sadistic. Nothing could be more foolish as an overall characterization of
these persons. It is like saying that a person thrown into a swift-flowing stream is necessarily
a fast swimmer, or that he has great stamina because he moves so rapidly relative to the
bank. The context of action must always be considered.
Milgram, Some Conditions, supra note 75, at 72-73.

135. Miller et al., Perception, supra note 131, at 127; see also Martin A. Safer, Attributing
Evil to the Subject, Not the Situation: Student Reaction to Mi/gram 's Film on Obedience, 6
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 205, 208 (1980) (suggesting that knowledge of the
results of Milgram's experiment causes people to overestimate the aggressive characteristics
of people generally).
136. Miller et al., Perception, supra note 131, at 127.
137. Professor Arthur Miller has noted:
(B]eing aware of this relatively high base rate of obedience should decrease the
correspondence between the act of shocking the learner (particularly high shock) and
personality and dispositions pertinent to such activity. Stated differently, if one knows that
65 percent of a sample of individuals perform in a somewhat unexpected manner, one should
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suggest that knowledge that a particular behavior was the modal
response to a situation will not substantially attenuate an observer's
dispositional attributions.138
Although a factfinder contemplating an entrapment defense would
seldom be presented with evidence of what portion of the population
would

commit

the

charged

offense

given

the

police

pressure,

insensitivity to consensus information is relevant to the entrapment
defense for two reasons. First, it confirms that the factfinder is not
likely to make causal attributions or findings of predisposition in a
manner that the scientist would describe as rational. Second, it
suggests

the

robustness

of

observers'

willingness

to

infer

predisposition from situational behavior. The abstract, pallid nature of
consensus information is unable to remedy the biased inferences
produced by the more vivid, concrete commission of the offense.
C.

Overconfidence and Reasonable Doubt

Determining inducement and predisposition is a difficult task,
hampered by cognitive limitation. Were they aware of their own
limitations, factfinders could mitigate the impact of these deficiencies
by decreasing the confidence with which they make these findings, but
research into the fundamental attribution error suggests that people
are

systematically

overconfident

in

predicting

others'

behavior.

Because the predisposition inquiry requires predicting whether the
defendant was likely to commit the offense absent police pressure,
factfinders are likely to be overconfident in making such findings. This
overconfidence works peculiarly to the disadvantage of the defendant
because it is he who is intended to enjoy the benefit of the reasonable
doubt on the issue of entrapment.139

be less prone to attribute personality dispositions as causes for such acts than if one assumes
the behavior to be much less probable.
Miller et al., Prediction, supra note 131, at 39. Milgram similarly observed:
A commonly offered explanation is that those who shocked the victim at the most severe
level were monsters, the sadistic fringe of society. But if one considers that almost two-thirds
of the participants fall into the category of "obedient" subjects, and that they represented
ordinary people . . . the argument becomes very shaky.
MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO

AUTHO RITY, supra note 75, at 5.

138. For further discussion of insensitivity to base rates in making predictions, see
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REV.
237 (1973); Nisbett & Borgida, supra note 33; and Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).
139. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548-49 (1992) ("Where the
Government has induced an individual to break the law and the defense of entrapment is at
issue . . . the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was
disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by Government
agents.").
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David Dunning, Lee Ross, Dale Griffin, and James Milojkoovic
demonstrated this phenomenon in a series of studies.140 Each study
required a subject to predict the response of a peer to various
situations along with a "confidence estimate" that gauged the subject's
belief

that

his

prediction

would

hold

true.141

The

amount

of

information the predictor had depended on which study he took part
in, ranging from merely viewing a photograph of the actor to having
been the actor's roommate.142 The actor whose behavior was to be
predicted was given a series of hypothetical situations and questions,
and instructed to choose one of two potential responses.143
The

predictors

consistently

failed

to

achieve

accuracy

commensurate with their confidence levels.144 In each version of the
study, a clear majority of the subjects gave overconfident estimates.
That

is,

average

confidence

estimates

exceeded

accuracy.145 Subjects displayed overconfidence for

80%

their
to

average

92%

of the

total predictions given.146
The studies also demonstrated that increases in confidence outpace
increases in accuracy.147 The more confident a predictor was in an
individual judgment, the more overconfident he was likely to be.148 As
a

result,

highly

confident

predictions

tended

to

be

highly

overconfident predictions.149

140. David Dunning et al., The Overconfidence Effect in Social Prediction, 58 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 568 (1990).
141. Id. at 570.
142 Id. at 570-72.
143. Id. at 570. For example, if the actor found money on the floor, would he keep it or
tum it in to the lost and found? Id. Other predictions included the target's choice of
magazine subscriptions between Playboy and the New York Review of Books, their
customary mode of studying for an exam (studying alone v. study group), and the self-rated
quality of their lecture notes (neat v. messy). Id.
144. Id. at 572.
145. Id.
146. Id. "Overconfidence" is defined as the subjects' mean confidence estimate minus
their mean accuracy. Id. For example, average confidence for predictions based on an
interview or long-standing contact with a roommate ranged from 75% to 78% across the five
studies, but average accuracy for those predictions was merely 60% to 68%. Id.
147. Low-confidence predictions were correct just over 50% of the time, medium
confidence predictions were correct about two-thirds of the time, and high-confidence
predictions were correct about three-quarters of the time. Id. at 573. An accurate prediction
was associated with a confidence rating of about 75%, and an inaccurate prediction with a
confidence rating of 72%. Id.
148. Id. at 574.
149. Id. Predictions made with a low degree of confidence were on average
overconfident by about six percentage points, and predictions made with a high degree of
confidence were about fourteen to twenty-seven percentage points overconfident. See id. at
574 tbl.2. "High confidence " predictions were defined as a confidence rating of 90% or
greater. Id.
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Dunning and his colleagues offered two relevant explanations for
overconfidence. First, virtually all of the overconfidence was due to
against-base-rate predictions - that is subjects predicted the actor
would behave differently from the modal response of his peers.150
Indeed,

the

more

pervasive

the

modal

response,

the

more

overconfident were predictions that the actor would deviate from it.151
The researchers' second explanation for overconfident behavioral
prediction is that it results from overconfident situational construals.152
Predicting an actor or the average person's behavior in a given
situation requires us to construe or even construct the incomplete
situational data on which we rely. Dunning and his colleagues suggest,
however, that predictors fail to adequately discount their confidence
in their predictions when data concerning situational variables are
uncertain. Instead, predictors typically generate a single construal
when presented with limited data concerning an ambiguous situation,
and then proceed to make predictions as if that construal
corresponded to perfect knowledge.153 The result is overconfident
predictions and trait assessments.
In a follow up study, Dunning and his colleagues demonstrated the
effect of construal processes on overconfident predictions.154 Subjects
were read a short description of a person's behavior in a given
situation: Peter, a sophomore at Stanford, participated in a seventy
five minute, four-person discussion on abortion, during which he
spoke for forty-five minutes.155 The subjects were then asked to give an
estimate of what portion of Stanford students would speak more than
Peter in a similar group discussion, and provide a

50 %

confidence

interval around this estimate.156 They then assessed Peter according to
three attributes: how opinionated, outgoing, and domineering he was
relative to his peers; and they similarly provided confidence intervals
for those traits.157
The subjects were subdivided into four groups. The first was the
"control group." Its members were merely given a chance to rethink

150. Id. at 576.
151. Id. at 577.
152 Id. at 579; see also Dale W. Griffin et al., The Role of Construal Processes in
Overconfident Predictions About the Self and Others, 59 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
1128 (1990).
153. Griffin et al., supra note 152, at 1138.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1136.
156. Id. A 50% confidence interval corresponds to a range of times within which the
subject believed the average Stanford student's speaking time would fall with 50%
likelihood.
157. Id.
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and alter their estimates as they saw fit.158 The second was the
"uncertain construal group." Its members were asked to write a short
essay describing how they construed the situation that Peter was in;
and then, after they were finished, to provide a new set of trait
assessment and confidence intervals.1 59 The third was the "certain
construal group," and its members were similarly instructed to write
an essay about how they construed Peter's situation. Before remaking
their assessments, however, the certain construal group was told to
assume that the situation possessed the exact characteristics they just
described in their essays.160 Finally, the fourth group was the " multiple
construal group." Its members were instructed to write multiple essays
about various ways the situation could have appeared, and were then
asked to reassess their estimates.161 Judgments about both what
portion of Stanford students would speak for a similar length of time
and what character traits Peter possessed varied widely, reflecting the
multiple reasonable construals of the ambiguous description of the
group discussion. 162
Subjects in the control, uncertain, and certain construal groups all
offered essentially the same sized confidence intervals before and after
receiving

their relevant construal instructions.163 The researchers

hypothesized that members of all three groups initially adopted a
particular construal of Peter's situation and made their estimates

accordingly. 1 64

When the certain construal group was instructed to assume that
their initial construal was in fact the correct one - to assume, in other
words, that they now had perfect information about the situation one would expect confidence to increase and the confidence interval
to narrow. This was not the case. The addition of perfect information
about the situational variables Peter was faced with had no significant
effect on the certain construal group's confidence.165

158. Id.
1 59. Id.
160. Id. at 1 13 1 , 1136.
161. Id. at 1 136.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1138 ("These results support the more general contention that people
typically generate a single construal of an ambiguous or incompletely specified situation and
then, unless powerfully prompted to do otherwise, make relevant assessments and
predictions as if their situational construals correspond to perfect knowledge. ").
165. Id. at 1 136 ("Subjects in the certain construal condition, like subjects in the control
and uncertain construal conditions, offered essentially the same size confidence intervals
before and after receiving the relevant construal instructions.").

Psychology, Factfinding, and Entrapment

February 2005]

785

The only group whose confidence interval changed from one
estimation to the next was the multiple-construal group.166 Members of
that group were forced to brainstorm and consider reasonable
situational construals other than their initial assessment.167 When
presented with the vagueness of their knowledge of the actual
situation Peter faced, the multiple-construal group decreased their
certainty in their estimations and widened their confidence intervals.168
Only by making the situational ambiguity highly salient, by requiring
subjects
to
generate
alternate
situational
construals,
was
overconfidence reduced.169
The

researchers

construals

also

found

produced

that

overconfidence

extreme

dispositional

in

situational

attributions.170

Logically, uncertainty about the situation that produced Peter's
behavior, especially given that his behavior seemed extreme, should
produce a higher degree of conservatism in making trait inferences
based solely on that single instance of behavior.171 When an actor's
response seems extreme, we can either infer that the actor's response
was indicative of his particular disposition, or we can assume that we

166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at

1 136.

Id.
Id.
Id. The researchers concluded:

We suggest that no matter how well one knows the particular individual - even if the
individual to be predicted is the self - one will often be guilty of erroneous predictions if
one fails to anticipate correctly -....hat the details of the "situation" in question will actually be
like and how the situation will be subjectively experienced. One will be guilty of
overconfidence, furthermore, if one fails to recognize that such objective details and
subjective representations matter a great deal . . . or fails to lower the subjective confidence
of one's predictions in light of one's uncertainty about such details.

Id. at

1 129. Professor Phoebe Ellsworth has similarly concluded:

Several different perceivers will come up with several somewhat dissimilar accounts of a
sequence of events. Once having arrived at a construal, or a story or explanation of the same
sequence of events, most people find it very difficult to imagine a different way of
interpreting the same events, and this leads them to underestimate severely their own
creative contribution to their "memory." Even though most people recognize in principle
that a good deal of perception is really interpretation, they are unable to make adequate
inferential adjustments . . . often behaving exactly as they would if their interpretation were
the only possible one.

Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better than One?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1989, at 205, 206 (citing Griffin et al., supra note 152).
See also Robert P. Vallone et al., Overconfident Prediction of Future A ctions and
Outcomes by Self and Others, 58 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 582 (1990) (discussing
overconfidence in predictions of the subject's own behavior as compared to overconfidence
in predicting the subject's roommate's behavior).

170. Griffin et al., supra note 152, at 1137.
171. Id. ("[U]ncertainty about the nature of the situation that prompted or provided the
context for a given actor's response, especially when the response seemed extreme and
potentially 'diagnostic,' should compel a rather high degree of conservatism in making trait
inferences about such an actor.").
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erred in construing the situation and that the actor's behavior was not,
after all, out of the ordinary. The more out of the ordinary the
behavior seems, the more likely it was that our construal was
inaccurate.
Dunning

demonstrated,

however,

that

subjects

made

little

allowance for such situational uncertainty. 172 Members of the certain
construal group, for which there was no situational uncertainty,
produced trait inferences no more extreme than the control or
uncertain construal

groups.173 Members of the multiple-construal

group, however, mitigated their dispositional inferences about Peter
after considering other reasonable construals of the situation.174
In an entrapment case applying the subjective standard, the
prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
either that the defendant was predisposed or that he was not
induced.175 Given the difficulties judges and juries have in accurately
making the factual findings that a plea of entrapment entails, we
would expect them to have a high level of doubt and, accordingly, a
high rate of

acquittal.

Experience

indicates,

however,

that

the

entrapment defense is rarely successful.176 Its inefficacy suggests that
factfinders may not be accurately applying the reasonable doubt
standard in entrapment cases. The low rate of acquittal may be
explained by the effect of the fundamental attribution error, which can
create overconfident causal attributions.

·

172. Id.
173. Id. ("As predicted, the certain construal condition subjects showed virtually no
increase in the extremity of their trait inferences about Peter . . . and produced change scores
that did not differ significantly from . . . the control and uncertain construal
conditions . . . . ).
"

174. Id. Other studies confirm Dunning's conclusions. In one study by McGuire,
observer-subjects were asked to predict the likelihood that actor-subjects would be helpful in
two different situations. In the first, the actor was asked to volunteer for a psychology
experiment, and in the second, the actor came upon a woman on crutches climbing some
stairs whose book bag was about to slip off of her shoulder. For some of the observers, the
subjects were unknown to them and only described to them in brief profiles; but in other
conditions, the observers knew the actors quite well. The predictions were only slightly
better than chance, but observers believed they would be quite accurate, especially if they
knew the actor well. In reality, knowing the actor failed to significantly increase the accuracy
of the observers' predictions. Observers were less accurate than they believed, and no more
accurate when they had a great deal of knowledge about the person whose behavior they
were trying to predict. The information they did have only served to make them
overconfident in their prediction. Ross & NISBEIT, supra note 30, at 135 (describing A.
McGuire, Mistaken Reliance on Individual Difference Variables in Predicting Social Behavior
(1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor); see
also Patricia G. Devine, Overattribution Effect: The Role of Confidence and A ttributional
Complexity, 52 S oc . PSYCHOL. Q. 149, 154 ( 1989) (providing confidence data for an
experiment in the Jones and Harris framework) .
175. E.g. , United States v . Tom, 330 F.3d 83, 8 9 (1st Cir. 2003).
176. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
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This overconfidence works peculiarly to the disadvantage of the
defendant in an entrapment case. When the factfinder determines
whether the defendant is predisposed or not, it may consider a variety
of character evidence and based on that, predict whether or not the
defendant was likely to commit a similar offense on his own.177
Assuming that most people are unlikely to commit a similar offense, a
finding of predisposition would be "against the base rate"; it would be
a finding that the defendant is likely to behave in a way different from
most other people. The researchers found that against-the-base-rate
predictions for a given actor are generally the most overconfident; and
the more deviant the predicted behavior was, the more overconfident
the

prediction

was.178

Therefore,

a

factfinder

who

makes

a

determination that the defendant was predisposed is making an
against-the-base-rate prediction and is likely to be overconfident in
that factual finding. That overconfidence increases the likelihood that
the judge or jury will find that predisposition was proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, when a more accurate assessment of the evidence
would reveal greater ambiguity. This effect is likely to be more
pronounced the more unusual, and therefore more against-the-base
rate, the crime in question is.179
It is tempting to conclude that increased uncertainty, whether
justified or not, is neutral, benefiting neither party, but that would
assume that the risk of error is shared equally between the prosecution
and the defense. Overconfidence, however, works to the advantage of
the party who has the burden of proof. In assessing the entrapment
defense, the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed.180 Under this
standard, the defendant should win whenever the factfinder believes
that,

more likely than not, the defendant

was

entrapped. The

defendant should also win sometimes when the factfinder believes that
the prosecution has proven that, more likely than not, the defendant
was not entrapped, but has not met the more rigorous "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard. If the factfinder believes that, more likely
than not, the defendant was entrapped, overconfidence has no effect.
Regardless of whether the confidence in that decision is high or low,

177. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 170-174 and accompanying text.
179. This effect may be mitigated by the adversarial presentation of evidence. Insofar as
this process compels the factfinder to consider both the prosecutor's and the defendant's
interpretation of the sting operation, it requires consideration of at least two situational
construals.
180. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 549 (1992). Placing the burden of proof on
the prosecution to rebut the defense represents a determination that "it is far worse to
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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the defendant is acquitted. But when the factfinder believes as an
initial matter that the defendant was not entrapped, overconfidence
works to the defendant's disadvantage by effectively lowering the
burden of proof. If, for example, the factfinder should have a
confidence level of only

60%

that the defendant was not entrapped,

the prosecution has not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt.181
If Dunning's conclusions hold true, however, the perceived confidence
level may exceed the reasonable-doubt threshold and result in an
erroneous conviction.182
In sum, studies in social prediction suggest that factual findings in
an_ entrapment case are likely to be made with a higher degree of
confidence than the evidence warrants. Insofar as these findings are
affected by the fundamental attribution error, not only are they more
likely to be incorrect, but they are more likely to be overconfident.
Overconfidence in a finding that the defendant was predisposed based
on the commission of the crime is likely worsened to the extent that
factfinders fail to generate and contemplate multiple construals of the
evidence concerning the police inducement. Finally, because the
prosecution

shoulders

the

burden

of

disproving the defense of

entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt, overconfidence works to the
defendant's disadvantage.
D.

Channel Factors Applied to Sting Operations

Subjects have a hard time predicting the behavior of particular
individuals or the average person in part because they underestimate
the impact of certain situational aspects called "channel factors." A
channel factor is a very small situational difference that produces
surprisingly large changes in behavior.183 In the study of the Good
Samaritan, whether the seminarian was in a hurry produced a large
change in behavior; therefore being rushed was a channel factor.184

181. One could set the reasonable-doubt threshold at 91 % based on Blackstone's
famous statement that "the law holds, that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than
that one innocent suffer." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 352 (photo. reprint
1992) (1765); cf C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence,
or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1332 (1982) (reporting that in a poll
of 167 federal judges, the mean probability assigned to "beyond a reasonable doubt" was
90.28% ). The reasoning of the argument contained in the text is unaffected by translating
"beyond a reasonable doubt" into a less-exacting percentage, so long as it exceeds 50%.
182. I use the phrase "erroneous conviction" not in the sense that the defendant was
convicted despite actually being entrapped. Rather, I use the term to mean that he was
convicted despite a substantial probability that he was entrapped. That is, an erroneous
conviction occurs when the prosecution did not prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.
183. See generally Ross & NISBETT, supra note 30, at 46-58 (discussing channel factors).
184. See id. at 48-49.
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Experimenters have identified a variety of channel factors. In the
Newton study of those most and least likely to donate to a food drive,
receiving a map to the donation site, a personalized letter, and a
phone call reminder were channel factors that greatly increased the
likelihood that the recipient would donate.185 Another commonly cited
channel

factor is the

presence

of

a model - another person

performing the action in question.186 In subsequent experiments,
Milgram showed that if teachers administered the learning experiment
in a group setting and one teacher refused to continue,

90

percent of

his fellow teachers followed suit.187
One of the most potent channel factors, known as the "foot-in-the
door" technique, can be convincing a subject to take a small initial
step along a path that would lead him to take much more substantial
action. This

phenomenon

was

aptly

demonstrated by

Jonathan

Freedman and Scott Fraser in a classic study.188 The researchers
approached middle-class homemakers and requested that they take a
small, innocuous step promoting a non-controversial cause, such as
signing a petition or placing a small sticker in the corner of their car
window supporting "safe driving."189 Two weeks later, a second
researcher approached the homemakers, and also a control sample
who had not previously been contacted, and requested that they take
another more substantial step.190 He asked them to place a large,
poorly built, ugly "Drive Carefully" sign in their yard.191 Only

17

percent of the control group agreed to let the researchers place the
sign, but

76

percent of those who had first signed the supporting

petition did.192
Channel factors have also proven useful in explaining previously
puzzling behavior. For example, Lee Ross and Richard Nisbett have
proposed the following channel factor based explanation of Milgram's
experiment on obedience.193 First, the subjects formed an implicit
contract with Milgram to complete the project and agreed to a specific

185. See id. at 132-33.
186. See id. at 49.
187. Milgram, Some Conditions, supra note 75, at 71.
188. Jonathan L. Freedman & Scott C. Fraser, Compliance Without Pressure: The Footin-the-Door Technique, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 195 (1966).
189. Id. at 199.
190. Id. at 200.
191. Id. ("The subject was shown a picture of a very large sign reading 'Drive Carefully'
placed in front of an attractive house. The picture was taken so that the sign obscured much
of the front of the house and completely concealed the doorway. It was rather poorly
lettered.").
192 Id. at 201 tbl.2.

193.

Ross &

NISBETT, supra note 30, at 56-58.
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procedure without realizing their full ramifications. The first few
shocks were small, perhaps even innocuous. It was only through a
series

of

gradual

dangerously

high

steps

that

levels

of

subjects
voltage.

were
If

the

led

to

administer

experimenter

had

immediately instructed them to give the highest shock possible - one
clearly labeled dangerous - he would likely have been widely
disobeyed.194 As one commentator has observed:
It is easy to see that there must be a line; it is not so easy to see where

that line ought to be. . . . [I]f the subject decides that giving the next
shock is not permissible . . . what was the j ustification for administering
the last shock he just gave? . . . The subject is trapped by his gradual

involvement in the experiment.195

Until the learner begins thumping on the wall or stops responding,
there is no clear point at which the subject can justify stopping now, as
opposed to at the previous shock.196 Consequently, it was at this point
that most of the refusals to continue occurred.197
Second, many of Milgram's subjects displayed a desire and intent
to quit, but, in the absence of a channel factor through which that
intent could be acted upon, most continued.198 Ross and Nisbett
suggest imagining that there was also a button on the control panel
that the subject was told he could press whenever he wished to
terminate the experiment.199 They argue that this minor situational

194. Cf Arnie Cann et al., Effects of Initial Request Size and Timing of a Second Request
on Compliance: The Foot in the Door and the Door in the Face, 32 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 774 (1975). Cann explored the effects of the onerousness of an initial request on
the rate of acquiescence to a subsequent request. Cann asked one group of subjects to
perform a relatively minimal task and then a task requiring an intermediate amount of time.
He asked a second group of subjects to first perform a laborious task and then, after they
responded, to perform the task requiring only an intermediate amount of time. Cann found
that subjects in the second group were much less likely to comply. Id. at 777 tbl.2.
195. JOHN SABINI & MAURY SILVERS, MORALITIES OF EVERYDAY LIFE 70 (?); see
John Sabini et al., The Really Fundamental Attribution E rror, 12 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 1 , 3
(2001).
196. See also Sabini et al., supra note 195, at 3 (describing the "slippery slope" aspect of
Milgram's experiment as "crucial").
197. Ross & NISBETT, supra note 30, at 56.
198. Despite their high rate of compliance, many of Milgram's subjects appeared quite
eager to quit. Many were extremely distraught by their actions and displayed extreme
tension, nervous laughter, trembling, and stuttering. Milgram, Behavioral Study, supra note
75, at 375. As one of Milgram's associates stated:
I observed a mature and initially poised businessman enter the laboratory smiling and
confident. Within 20 minutes he was reduced to a twitching, stuttering wreck, who was
rapidly approaching a point of nervous collapse. He constantly pulled on his earlobe, and
twisted his hands. At one point he pushed his fist into his forehead and muttered: "Oh God,
let's stop it." And yet he continued to respond to every word of the experimenter, and
obeyed to the end.

Id. at 377 (quoting an observer).

199. Ross & NISBETT, supra note 30, at 57.
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change would drastically increase the number of subjects who refuse
to continue by providing a simple exit from an uncomfortable,
inducing situation.200 One channel factor is, therefore, the provision of
a means of escaping an inducing situation.
Third, Ross and Nisbett argue that the subjects were less likely to
disobey the experimenter because the situation did not add up.201
Although the subjects believed they were actually taking part in an
experiment and actually administering severe shocks, the behavior of
the experimenter was contrary to expectations. The experimenter did
not express any concern about the safety of the learner or even check
to make sure he was okay. In such a situation, where nothing makes
sense, the subject may be less likely to act decisively or disavow role
expectations. 202
Milgram's follow-up study supports Ross and Nisbett's conclusion.
Milgram repeated his experiment, but instead of requiring the teacher
to incrementally increase the shock with each wrong answer, he
allowed them to set any voltage level they wanted.203 Under those
circumstances, only 2.5 percent of teachers administered the maximum
shock.204

Milgram's

original

experiment

was,

therefore,

not

a

particularly good measure of the teachers' disposition to inflict pain.205
A

typical

government

sting

is

akin

to

a

test

for

criminal

predisposition.206 When the suspect takes the bait and commits the
crime,

he

has

tested

positive.

When

the

suspect

declines

the

opportunity, he tests negati-ie. A non-predisposed suspect who is
induced into committing the crime is a "false-positive" and indicative
of a failure in the sting's design. The desirability of a particular sting

200. See id.
201. Id. at 57-58.
202. Consider one teacher's response during post-experiment questioning:
My reactions were awfully peculiar. I don't know if you were watching me, but my reactions
were giggly, and trying to stifle laughter. This isn't the way I usually am. This was a sheer
reaction to a totally impossible situation. And my reaction was to the situation of having to
hurt somebody. And being totally helpless and caught up in a set of circumstances where I
just couldn't deviate and I couldn't try to help.
MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY, supra note 75, at 54 (quoting a subject).
203. Id. at 70-72.
204. Id. at 60-61 tbl.3.
205. Milgram, however, never completely abandoned the search for dispositional
explanations for why some teachers obeyed and why others disobeyed. See id. app. II. But,
without using the term "channel factors," he described the teachers as "integrated into a
situation that carries its own momentum. The subject's problem then is how to become
disengaged from a situation which is moving in an altogether ugly direction." Milgram, Some
Conditions, supra note 75, at 73.
206. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441-42 (1932) ("The appropriate object
of [a sting operation] frequently essential to the enforcement of the Jaw, is to reveal the
criminal design . . . . ").
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design is largely a function of the number of "true-positives" - i.e.,
predisposed criminals - it catches and how few false-positives it
produces. The entrapment defense, by acquitting some of the false
positives, is

one way of discouraging the use of abusive sting

operations and encouraging the police to more narrowly tailor their
efforts.
Channel factors are one method that can be used to minimize false
positives.207 For example, providing the defendant with a clear
opportunity to terminate a high-pressure police encounter may protect
the innocent. As discussed above, Ross and Nisbett hypothesized that
many of Milgram's teachers continued to shock learners for as long as
they did because they did not perceive a clear means of exiting what
was

clearly

an

uncomfortable situation.208 The

provision

of

an

"experiment termination" button on the control panel likely would
have substantially reduced the number of fully-compliant teachers.209
Similarly, Milgram demonstrated that fewer teachers administered the
shocks when the experimenter issued commands by telephone instead
of face-to-face.210 Each of these measures would help, in Milgram's
experiment, to distinguish those truly predisposed to aggressive
behavior from the ordinary person. Because they provide a method of
separating the ordinary person from the predisposed, I shall refer to
these situational manipulations as "exculpating channel factors."
The goal of narrowly-tailored sting operations is, however, in
tension with police incentives to maximize the number of convictions
and the length of sentences.211 The police may, in other words, create

207. Another method of reducing false-positives is requmng the police to have
reasonable suspicion that the target is engaged in or is preparing to engage in illegal activity
before engaging in a sting operation. Teri L. Chambers, Note, United States v. Jacobson: A
Call for Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activity as a Threshold Limitation on
Governmental Sting Operations, 44 ARK. L. REV. 493, 510 (1991); J. Gregory Deis, Note,
Economics, Causation, and the Entrapment Defense, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1207, 1229 n.153;
Jack B. Harrison, Note, The Government as Pornographer: Government Sting Operations
and Entrapment: United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct.
1535 (1992), 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1067, 1088-94 (1993); Maura F.J. Whelan, Comment, Lead
Us Not into (Unwarranted) Temptation: A Proposal to Replace the Entrapment Defense with
a Reasonable-Suspicion Requirement, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1 193, 1216 (1985); Michael 0.
Zabriskie, Comment, If the Postman Always "Stings" Twice, Who Is the Next Target? - An
Examination of the Entrapment Theory, 19 J. CONTEMP. L. 217, 237-44 (1993).
208. See supra Section l.D.
209. The signs of severe stress that most subjects displayed suggest that, if given a clear
opportunity to escape, most subjects would have taken it. See supra notes 198-205 and
accompanying text.
210. MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY, supra note 75, at 59-62.
211. Cf PATRICK M. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 4
(1965). Wall argues:
identifications [of suspects] made by [eye-witness] policemen in highly competitive activities,
such as undercover narcotic agents, whose chances for promotion may depend upon the
number of arrests made because of their sales, should be scrutinized with special care. There
is a danger that their identifications may be influenced unconsciously by their desire for

stings

that
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maximize,

rather than

minimize,

false-positives

and

encourage the already predisposed to commit more serious crimes
than they otherwise would. One method of doing so is the use of what
I will call "inculpating channel factors" - small situational changes
that have the tendency to produce false-positives. The "foot-in-the
door" technique," in which the police convince the defendant to
commit some minor transgression in order

to make him more

agreeable to a larger scheme, is one such method especially prone to
abuse.212

This

could,

for

example,

occur

when

a

defendant

is

predisposed to sell small amounts of a drug, but not enough to qualify
for a sufficiently substantial sentencing enhancement.213 An informant
or

undercover

officer

could

exploit

this

lesser

disposition

by

establishing a small-scale drug operation with the suspect and then
applying pressure to increase the quantity traded until the defendant
qualified for the more severe sentence.214
Use of inculpating channel factors poses a peculiar threat to the
entrapment defense precisely because they can sharply effect behavior
in ways that factfinders find difficult to predict and account for. Either
through ignorance of the effects of channel factors,

or

willful

manipulation, the police can design sting operations that produce a
large number of false-positives that an unwary judge or jury will have

promotion.
Id. at 14.

212. See supra notes 188-192 and accompanying text.
213. Some courts have recognized a limited form of the defense known as "sentencing
entrapment," which occurs when the defendant is induced, through "outrageous official
conduct," to commit a more serious version of a crime than that to which he was
predisposed. See United States v. Si, 343 F.3d 1 1 16, 1 128 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 424 (8th Cir. 1993). Sentencing entrapment may occur, for example,
when a defendant, seeking to make a small drug buy, is pressured into purchasing a larger
amount by an undercover agent. The burden of establishing sentencing entrapment is on the
defendant. United States v. Stavig, 80 F.3d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1996). A successful showing
of sentencing entrapment does not result in acquittal, but merely a downward sentencing
departure. See, e.g. , United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1 103, 1 108 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding
sentencing entrapment and remanding for resentencing). The theory is not accepted by all
the federal circuits, see United States v. Miller, 71 F.3d 813, 818 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the
theory of sentencing entrapment), and has been rejected by most state courts that have
considered the issue. See, e.g., Kelley v. State, 821 So. 2d 1255, 1257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2002); State v. Blackmon, 78 S.W.3d 322, 332 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001); State v. Hardy, 715
So. 2d 466, 472 (La. 1998); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 659 N.E.2d 741, 744 (Mass. 1996). But
see Leech v. State, 66 P.3d 987, 989-90 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003) (adopting the theory);
Commonwealth v. Adams, 760 A.2d 33, 40 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (adopting same).
214. See Leech v. State, 66 P.3d 987 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003). In Leech, the defendant
operated a small-scale methamphetamine operation with a government informant. Id. at 989.
Their usual course of dealing was that the informant would borrow money from the
defendant, which he would repay in small quantities of methamphetamine. Id. at 995
(Chapel, J., dissenting). On one occasion, the informant offered the defendant a quantity of
methamphetamine worth 28 times the value of the debt as repayment. Id. at 995 n.31
(Chapel, J., dissenting). This amount also qualified the defendant for the more serious
charge of trafficking. Id. at 995 (Chapel, J., dissenting).
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difficulty separating from true-positives. Prosecutors, facing similar
incentives to achieve convictions and lengthy sentences, and suffering
from the same cognitive biases as factfinders, may not always be relied
upon to refuse to prosecute a defendant snared in a heavy-handed
sting.21s
The

dangers

that

inculpating

channel

factors

pose

for

the

entrapment defense is illustrated by the First Circuit's decision in

United States v. Connell.216 In that case, an undercover agent arranged
with a stockbroker, Connell, to launder money from a gambling
operation in a series of transactions.2 1 7 During the fourth transaction,

the agent informed Connell that the money was actually derived from

the illegal drug trade.218 Knowledge or belief that the money being
laundered was criminally derived carried with it a much stiffer
sentence than laundering for other purposes, but the enhancement
only applied when the defendant actually believed that the money was
criminally derived, not when he "reasonably should have believed."2 1 9
The purpose for the agent's deception was solely to expose Connell to
a stiffer sentence. Accordingly, Connell argued that the sentencing
enhancement

should

not

apply

because,

although

he

was

not

entrapped into laundering money generally, he was entrapped into
laundering money that he believed to be criminally derived.220
The police in

Connell employed Freedman and Fraser's classic

"foot-in-the-door" technique to ratchet up the severity of Connell's

215. One commentator observed after interviewing prosecutors:
In the extraordinary case where a possible (entrapment) defense is present . . . defense
counsel will visit the prosecutor and argue that the charges should be dropped because the
defendant was entrapped. The prosecutors never accede to this plea because of the lack of
appeal the defense has to their sense of oughtness, because of their perception of their role
in the criminal process, and because of their private ambitions.
It might be suspected that the resistance could be said to stem simply from the fact that
"the law is on our side." But the prosecutors were found to have a distinct attitude toward
the "entrapped defendant" in a narcotics sale case. They felt that his only excuse was faulty
police methods, not a violation of the "letter" of the law, and the seriousness of his crime
showed that he was not "innocent." While they all felt that the facts in Toler should have
constituted entrapment, they all agreed that they would not have refused to prosecute the
case unless it was shown "that the police officer twisted his [the defendant's] arm."
Bancroft, supra note 2 1 , at 161 (footnote omitted). People v. Toler held that the defendant
was not entrapped where the undercover agent requested drugs from him more than twenty
times before he succumbed, and when the agent appealed to the defendant's sympathy by
telling him the drugs were for a terminally ill narcotics addict. 185 N.E.2d 874 (Ill. 1962).
Bancroft concluded that "the defense of entrapment never triggers the decision not to
prosecute." Bancroft, supra note 21, at 162 (emphasis added).
216. 960 F.2d 191 (1st Cir. 1992).
217.

Id.

218.

Id.

at 193.

219.

Id.

220.

Id. at

at 195 n.7.
194.
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sentence.221 The police and Com1ell agreed to a crime that Connell was
predisposed to - laundering non-drug derived money. By exposing
himself to this degree of criminal liability, he became personally
invested in the criminal enterprise. The subsequent request to launder
drug money was - other than the money's origin - a request that
differed only in degree but not in kind.
A comparison to Milgram's teachers is illustrative. Both Connell
and the teachers agreed to an initial set of procedures.222 In Connell's
case, it was money laundering for a non-criminal enterprise.223
Although this act was illegal, it does not compel a conclusion that he
was predisposed to launder money for drug dealers, but neither
Milgram's teachers nor Connell realized the scope of the procedures
to which they had agreed. Both Milgram's teachers and Connell
engaged in a series of steps in furtherance of the arrangement and
then were presented with a critical juncture. For the teachers, it was
the learner banging on the wall and ceasing to respond to questions;
for Connell, it was being told that he had become part of a major drug
operation.224 Presumably, the police believed that Connell was less
likely to agree to launder money for a drug operation; that is why they
waited until he had conducted three illegal transactions before telling
him. Similarly, Milgram knew that teacher obedience would be
substantially reduced if he asked them to start off giving the highest
level of shock to a protesting learner. And neither the teachers nor
Connell were provided with an exculpating channel factor. It seems
unlikely that a stock broker, when confronted with the fact that he is
laundering money for a ring of drug dealers, would feel free to call the
arrangement off in the absence of a clear escape route. Similarly,
Milgram's subjects were incapable of putting their generalized desire
to quit administering shocks into action in the absence of a clear
means of acting on it.
The court rejected Connell's sentencing entrapment argument,
reasoning:

221. See supra Section l.D.
222. Compare Connell, 960 F.2d at 193 (describing the procedures that Connell and the
police agreed upon for their money laundering operation), with Milgram, Behavioral Study,
supra note 75, at 373 (describing the procedure for Milgram's experiment to which the
subjects agreed).
223. Connell, 960 F.2d at 193 ("During their first meeting, [the undercover agent] told
Connell that the money was coming from an elaborate gambling operation in Atlantic City
(whether legal or illegal, [the agent] did not specify).").
224. Id. at 194.
[Connell] contends that the vice lay in the timing: by broaching the subject of the currency's
supposed origin (drug trafficking) only after Connell had fully completed three episodes of
money laundering, the undercover agent forced (or lured) him into actions he would
otherwise have eschewed, i.e., peripheral participation in the narcotics trade.
Id.
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By their nature, sting operations are designed to tempt the criminally

inclined, and a well-constructed sting is often sculpted to test the limits of

the target's criminal inclinations. Courts should go very slowly before

staking out rules that will deter government agents from the proper
performance of their investigative duties.225

To the contrary, because a sting operation is intended to merely
produce a temporal displacement of crime - causing its commission
at a time when the police can catch the defendant - a well-designed
sting operation should not strive to push the defendant beyond the
limits he would have faced in his natural environment. " [T]est[ing] the
limits of the target's criminal inclinations"226 when he would not have
been so tested otherwise is to engage in the inefficient, sterile activity
of first inciting crime and then punishing, which the entrapment
defense was meant to prevent.227 As Milgram's experiment proves,
most people have some potential to commit frightening, criminal
acts.228 In response to adept manipulation of channel factors, the
ordinary person may commit criminal acts well beyond what would
ordinarily be expected. If the channel factor is subtle enough, the
police

conduct

can

dramatically

affect

behavior

while

never

approaching what a judge is likely to perceive as sufficiently egregious
to warrant a sentencing entrapment defense.
It is impossible to know how Connell would have behaved under a
more narrowly tailored sting operation. Whether he would have
declined to launder drug money if it had been the first request that the
undercover agent had made, or whether he would have quit had he
been told he could, is speculation. Whichever the case, the

Connell

court's statement that "we find no grounds for concern in the
circumstances at bar"229 displays a troubling lack of consideration of
both how

the

police can

use

situational

variables

to sculpt

a

defendant's behavior, and how a tailored sting operation could be
conducted to minimize false positives.23° Closer attention in future
cases to whether the government took efforts to offer - or steps to

225. Id. at 196.
226. Id.
227. See United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.,
concurring) (arguing that one purpose of the entrapment defense is to prevent wasting law
enforcement resources by instigating crime that would not otherwise occur).
228. Had the learner in fact been shocked, many versions of Milgram's experiment
would have required the teacher to commit criminal acts. See, e.g. , MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE
TO AUTHORITY, supra note 75, at 3-4 (describing experiment and fact that, under some
variations, the learner demanded to be released and the teacher was required to forcibly
place the learner's hand on a shock plate).
229. Connell, 960 F.2d at 196.
230. The FBI, for example, has promulgated guidelines that instruct agents to model
undercover operations on the real world as closely as they can. MARX, supra note 105,
at 182.
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avoid offering - exculpating channel factors could focus judicial
scrutiny on the situational nuance that police officers potentially
exploit.
II.

SOLUTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES

This Note has argued that the fundamental attribution error
produces factfinding inaccuracies that diminish the ability of the
entrapment defense to exculpate the unwary innocent and serve as a
meaningful check on police overreaching. In addition, systematic
biases in factfinding are ripe for exploitation by overzealous law
enforcement who could,

for example, tailor sting operations to

maximize the number of unpredisposed targets who commit the
offense, thereby maximizing arrests, convictions, and sentences at the
expense of accuracy.
This Part proposes three modest reforms that might remedy some
of the dangers the fundamental attribution error poses for the
entrapment defense. First, it argues that the objective test should be
adopted as a question of fact for the jury. Second, it proposes that, at a
minimum, some additional instruction to the jury can attenuate some
of the effects of the fundamental attribution error. Finally, it suggests
that the failure of the police to provide exculpating channel factors
and the inclusion of inculpating channel factors in the design of sting
operations should be looked upon with greater suspicion by the courts.
A.

An Objective Test Decided by a Jury

The subjective test for entrapment, as applied in the federal courts,
classifies both predisposition and inducement as questions of fact for
the jury. The objective test in most jurisdictions differs in two regards.
First, the objective test is applied by a judge, not a jury.231 Second, it
focuses solely on the degree of inducement offered by the police, not
the defendant's predisposition.232 Common reasons for preferring that
the judge decide the issue are that he is better qualified to set
standards for future police conduct,233 jury verdicts give little future
guidance for sting operations,234 the judge is less likely to be swayed by

231. The question-of-law approach has been articulated in the Supreme Court by Justice
Roberts, concurring in Sorrels v. United States. 287 U.S. 435, 457 (1932) (Roberts, J.,
concurring) ("It is the province of the court and the court alone to protect itself and the
government from such prostitution of the criminal law. . . . Proof of entrapment, at any stage
of the case, requires the court to stop the prosecution, direct that the indictment be quashed,
and the defendant set at liberty.").
232. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303 (2003); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1962).
233. MARCUS, supra note 3, at 189.
234. Judge Traynor, for example, has stated:
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otherwise-inadmissible evidence of prior bad acts, or that "evidence
pertaining to guilt is likely to infect a jury determination."235
This

Section

takes

a

different,

somewhat

unconventional

approach,236 adopting some of the arguments others have made in
favor of the objective test, but contending that the jury should apply it,
not a judge. First, entrapment should be a question for the jury, which
is more likely to engage in group discussion, an activity that has been
shown to attenuate the effects of the fundamental attribution error.
Second, the jury should apply the objective standard because it
eliminates the focus on the defendant's predisposition, the inquiry
most influenced by a dispositional bias and the use of otherwise
inadmissible evidence of prior bad acts.237

1.

The Benefits ofJury Discussion

The proper division of labor between the judge and jury has been
the source of extensive contemporary debate.238 I do not seek to

A jury verdict of guilty or not guilty tells the police nothing about the jury's evaluation of the
police conduct. A verdict of guilty may mean that the jury did not believe the defendant's
testimony that would have established entrapment. It may also mean that the jury did not
believe that the conduct created a substantial risk of inducing one not ready to commit the
offense into doing so.
People v. Moran, 463 P.2d 763, 769 (Cal. 1970) (Traynor, CJ., dissenting).
235. People v. D'Angelo, 257 N.W.2d 655, 659 (Mich. 1977).
236. See, e.g. , WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 5.3(b) (stating that
"it is not entirely clear why [the objective test should be a j ury question]"); Myron
Moskovitz, You Can't Tell a Book by Its Title, 8 CRIM. L.F. 125, 134-35 (1997) ("I can't see
why entrapment should ever be decided by a jury.") (reviewing H. RICHARD UVILLER,
VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE FLAWED PROSECUTION OF CRIME IN AMERICA (1996)); Laura
Gardner Webster, Building a Better Mousetrap: Reconstructing Federal Entrapment Theory
Sorrells to Mathews, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 605, 630 (1990) (describing the "breathtaking
naivete" with which the Supreme Court allows the j ury to decide entrapment).

from

237. It should be cautioned, however, that although a jury-determined objective test
may improve the accuracy of factfinding, juries may have more difficulty understanding the
law of the objective test than the subjective test. See Eugene Borgida & Roger Park, The
12 LAW & HUM . BEHA v.
19 (1988) (arguing that juror comprehension of the objective standard was lower than that of

Entrapment Defense: Juror Comprehension and Decision Making,

the subjective standard). This, however, may be the result not of any inherent conceptual
complexity within the objective standard, but with overly confusing ways of explaining it in
jury instructions. See id. at 35-36 & n.15. Subjects in psychological studies, for example, do
not seem to have difficulty understanding what it means to predict what an "average person"
will do in a given situation. But it is unsurprising that a j uror might not understand what it
means to determine what a "hypothetical, law-abiding, non-predisposed, reasonable person"
would do in response to police pressure. The problem with juror comprehension of the
objective test may not lie, therefore, in the form of the test, but in the form of the
instruction.
238. On the question of whether the j udge or jury is a better factfinder, see Ellsworth,

supra note 169, at 217-18; Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock
after Twelve Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 1 8 1 (Robert Litan ed.,
1993); Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us about
Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 137
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resolve the dispute, but instead wish to suggest one reason for
preferring that juries resolve the issue of entrapment: juries enjoy the
benefit of group discussion.
A series of studies suggests that the process of deliberation and
discussion ameliorates the effects of the fundamental attribution error.
In one study, Edward Wright and Gary Wells replicated a scenario
very similar to Jones and Harris's study of the readers of pro- and anti
Castro essays.239 That is, all subjects read essays arguing a particular
position. One half of the readers were told the writer was assigned his
editorial position, while the other half were told that he chose it.240
Wright and Wells also divided the readers of the essays into four
groups: those who would immediately answer questions about the
essay's author after reading it, those who would answer the questions
after a ten minute delay, those who were given a ten minute delay and
told they would discuss their answers with a group after answering,
and those who were actually given ten minutes to discuss the questions
with a group before answering.241
The results indicated that group discussion substantially reduced
the impact of the fundamental attribution error.242 Those subjects who
engaged in group discussion were much less likely to erroneously
discern the author's dispositional traits from the editorial position of
an essay that he had no choice in deciding.243 Neither anticipating that
one

would

engage

in

group

discussion

after

answering

the

questionnaire nor having an additional ten minutes to think about the
questionnaire before answering had a significant effect.244 Those who
participated in group discussion were much less likely to draw
dispositional inferences from situationally constrained behavior, but
Wright and Wells were not able to provide a definitive explanation of

(Robert Litan ed., 1993); see also United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005) (holding that
the mandatory nature of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment
due to judicial factfinding); Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) (holding that the
maximum sentence a judge may impose is based on the facts admitted by the defendant or
found by a jury, not the judge).
239. Edward F. Wright & Gary L. Wells, Does Group Discussion Attenuate the
15 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 531 (1985). Wells, however, instructed
the authors to write about whether a portion of Canada should secede. Id. at 535.

Dispositional Bias?,
240.

Id. at 536-37.

241.

Id.

at 536.

242 Id. at 542 ("The tendency of perceivers to make dispositionally-biased attributions
for behavior performed under constraint was not only reduced, but eliminated, when
attributors were instructed to render their judgment after a group discussion of the critical
attribution question.").
243. Id. at 540 tbl.1. Recall that because the readers were told that the editorial position
of the essay was assigned to the writer and not of his own volition, it was logically irrelevant
to the writer's actual opinion.
244.

Id.
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the phenomenon.245 Subsequent studies have confirmed the value of
group discussion in making dispositional attributions.246
A plausible explanation for the benefits of group discussion may
be found in the overconfidence studies of David Dunning.247 Recall
that when Dunning forced subjects to write essays providing multiple
interpretations of an ambiguous set of facts, the effects of the
fundamental attribution error were reduced. Subjects were less likely
to infer dispositional traits from situationally constrained behavior,
and they were less likely to be overconfident. The act of writing essays
in Dunning's experiment may have had the same effect as the group
discussion in the Wells and Wright experiment. Just as writing essays
providing alternate construals of an ambiguous situation forced
Dunning's

subjects

to

confront

the uncertainty of

their

initial

assessment of the facts, so might discussing those facts with a diverse
group of strangers with unique perspectives. Although this may not
result in a complete revision of their interpretation, it reminds jurors
that their construal of the facts is not always the only reasonable
one.24s
The work of Wells, Wright, and Dunning therefore provides an
overlooked

reason to allow the jury to decide the question of

entrapment, as it commonly does under the subjective test. The
objective test as it is commonly applied, is flawed in that it views the
entrapment inquiry as exclusively a question of law for the judge.249
There is, however, no guarantee that a judge would engage in
fundamental-attribution-error-attenuating group discussion. Indeed,
unless one of her law clerks observed all of the relevant testimony,
there is no one with whom she could effectively do so. Those
jurisdictions

that

reserve the entrapment inquiry for

the judge

abandon the best-known method of reducing the effects of the
fundamental attribution error: discussion.250

245. Id. at 544.
246. See Gwen M. Wittenbaum & Garold Stasser, The Role of Prior Expectancy and
Group Discussion in the Attribution of Attitudes, 3 1 1. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 82
(1995). As encouraging as these studies are, the benefits of group discussion do not eliminate
the effects of the fundamental attribution error, especially when the inquiry is one of
judgment, without a demonstrably correct answer. Id. at 102.
247. See supra Section l.C.
248. See Ellsworth, supra note 169, at 206 ("If it does nothing else, group
deliberation . . . forces people to realize that there are different ways of interpreting the
same facts . . . . A judge does not have this vivid reminder that alternative construals are
possible."). The adversary process by itself may by itself encourage the consideration of
multiple construals, but more research is needed to determine to what extent.
249. See, e.g., State v. Valdez-Molina, 897 P.2d 993, 995 (Idaho 1995); People v.
D'Angelo, 257 N.W.2d 655, 660 (Mich. 1977).
250. This is not to suggest either that the average judge is worse than the average Ione
juror. or that the exceptional judge might not be less prone to the fundamental attribution
error than the average jury. Indeed, studies have shown that certain individuals who score
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The Benefits of the Objective Test

The objective test is preferable on two grounds related to the
accuracy of factfinding. First, because it focuses solely on the inducing
effects of the police conduct, while abandoning any inquiry into the
defendant's predisposition, it eliminates the element of the subjective
test that is most susceptible to bias by the fundamental attribution
error. Second, because the disposition of the defendant is no longer
relevant, there is no need to admit prejudicial character and bad-acts
evidence.251
Studies suggest that the effects that the fundamental attribution
error has on the predisposition inquiry are more pervasive and more
difficult

to

remedy.

In

one

illuminating

experiment,

Gtinter

Bierbrauer demonstrated that subjects placed under certain conditions
are better able to predict the behavior of the ordinary "teacher" in
Milgram's experiment.252 Bierbrauer recreated Milgram's experiment,
and allowed subjects to observe one teacher administer the entire
sequence of shocks.253 After witnessing the experiment, subjects were
asked to assess both the inducing effect of the experiment and to make
dispositional attributions to the particular teacher they observed.254
Specifically, they were required to predict the percentage of teachers
who would refuse to continue at various shock levels, and the highest
level of shock that the subject himself, his best friend, the learner, and
the average Stanford student would administer if they were the
teacher.255 They were then asked to rate the teacher they had just
observed on four personality traits and predict his behavior in five
hypothetical situations.256 One-third of Bierbrauer's subjects were
required to answer these questions immediately after witnessing the

well on the " Attributional Complexity Scale,"

see Garth J.O. Fletcher et al., A ttributional
Complexity: An Individual Differences Measure, 51 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 875
(1986), are less prone to the fundamental attribution error. See Devine, supra note 174.

One possible compromise solution would be to give the defendant the option of trying
the question of entrapment to a jury at trial, or to a judge before trial. Cf State v. Grilli, 230
N.W.2d 445, 455 (Minn. 1975) (applying a subjective entrapment theory and granting the
defendant the option to present the defense to either a judge in a pre-trial hearing, or a jury
at trial).
251.

See FED. R. Evm.

404 (prohibiting the use of character evidence and evidence of

other crimes "to show action in conformity therewith," but allowing admission for other
purposes, such as proving predisposition).
252. Giinter Bierbrauer, Why Did He Do It? Attribution of Obedience and the
Phenomenon of Dispositional Bias, 9 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 67, 73 tbl . 1 (1979).
253.

Id.

254.

Id. a t 72.

at 7 1 .

255.

Id.

at 72.

256. Id. at 72-73. The hypothetical situations involved the teacher "making decisions
involving adaptability, life-rescuing, compliance, cheating, and personal interference. " Id.
at 73.

802

Michigan Law Review

[Vol.

103:759

experiment, one-third were required to play a number of games for
thirty minutes before answering, and one-third were instructed to
write and think about the experiment for thirty minutes before
answering.257
The

results

revealed

that

delaying

the

subjects'

responses

improved their perception of situational control. Those subjects who
were instructed to write and think about the experiment performed
the best, predicting that the average student would administer a higher
maximum shock and that a smaller percentage would disobey.258
Although delayed-response subjects still predicted higher rates of
disobedience than Milgram demonstrated, time for contemplation
drastically improved the subjects' assessment of how the average
person would perform in Milgram's experiment.259 Thinking about
situational constraints, in other words, increased the accuracy of the
subjects' assessment of the inducing effects of Milgram's experiment.
Bierbrauer's subjects,

however, did not seem to benefit from

contemplation when it came to inquiries into what more closely
resembled predisposition. Subjects in all three groups drew strong
dispositional inferences about the teacher they witnessed, and they
were willing to make strong predictions about his future behavior in
hypothetical

situations.260

There

was

no

statistically

significant

difference in this regard between the three groups.261 Bierbrauer
concluded that "opportunity to contemplate the witnessed behaviour
does not decrease dispositional attribution."262 This suggests that the
process of deliberation may increase the accuracy of the inducement
inquiry (what the ordinary person will do) somewhat, but fails to
increase the accuracy of the predisposition inquiry (what qualities the
defendant has or whether he is likely to break the law absent police
persuasion).
The effects of the fundamental attribution error might be further
attenuated by instruction that encourages additional deliberation.
Merely anticipating future discussion does not seem to provide the
same

benefits

as

the

actual

process

of

group

discussion.263

Approximately one-half of all juries begin their deliberations with a
vote.264 In addition to the danger that an opening vote will commit

257.

Id. at 71.

258.

Id. at 73 tbl.l.

259.

Id.

260.

Id.

261.

Id. at 75-76.

262.

Id. at 76.

263.

Wright & Wells, supra note

264.

Ellsworth, supra note

169,

239,

at 542.

at 214.
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jurors to their initial position too early, the jury might also achieve
discussion-obviating unanimity. Because

the amount of dialogue

required to substantially diminish the impact of the fundamental
attribution error is quite small, measures that encourage at least a
minimal period of discussion, such as discouraging the jury from
beginning deliberation with a vote, are a virtually costless method of
increasing jury accuracy. 265
The second

and

more obvious benefit from eliminating the

predisposition element is that the defendant's predisposition is no
longer relevant, thereby eliminating the need to introduce prejudicial
character evidence.266 When courts apply the subjective test for
entrapment, they routinely admit evidence relevant to the defendant's
predisposition that would, under normal circumstances, be excluded as
impermissible character evidence, such as evidence of the defendant's
prior bad acts.267 Introduction of such evidence invites the jury to
convict the defendant based upon her prior, uncharged conduct.268
Adoption of the objective test eliminates this danger.
B.

Closing Arguments

The easiest, least expensive, and least objectionable partial remedy
for these problems is a more fully informed jury. The factfinding
accuracy of the jury may be improved through a variety of techniques.
It may, for example, help if jurors are encouraged to generate multiple
situational construals of the evidence.
Closing arguments may also suggest that the jurors imagine
themselves

in

the

defendant's

situation.

Studies

suggest

that

experiencing the situational constraints a subject was under when she
acted tends to mitigate the effects of the fundamental attribution
error. In their experiment on attitude attribution from pro- and anti
Castro essays, Jones and Harris discovered that one way they could
reduce their subjects' likelihood of drawing unwarranted inferences
was by requiring them to write their own assigned-position pro- or

265. See Wright & Wells, supra note 239, at 542 (concluding that increased decision time
did not further the disposition-attenuating effects of discussion so long as some discussion
occurred).
266. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
267. See, e.g., Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932) (stating that "if the
defendant seeks acquittal by reason of entrapment he cannot complain of an appropriate
and searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition as bearing upon that issue").
268. D. Craig Lewis, Proof and Prejudice: A Constitutional Challenge to the Treatment of
Prejudicial Evidence in Federal Criminal Cases, 64 WASH. L. REV. 289, 325 (1989)
("[E]vidence of uncharged misconduct can lead a jury to convict an accused, even if guilt of
the charged offense has not been clearly demonstrated, because the accused has been shown
either to be a person deserving of punishment for bad character or to be guilty of other sins
for which the accused has never been punished.").

Michigan Law Review

804

[Vol. 103:759

anti-Castro essay before judging the disposition of other authors.269
When the salience of the situational constraint was increased, the
subjects were more hesitant to assume the disposition of others
similarly situated.270 This, others have argued, is because actors are
much more likely to see their actions as situationally constrained.271
The actor's attention is focused outward on situational cues, rather
than inward on her own behavior, but for the observer, the focal
stimulus is the actor himself.272
The

nature

of

the

adversarial

process

already

provides

a

substantial opportunity to present alternative interpretations of the
facts surrounding the commission of an offense. This effect can be
amplified by

jury instruction or

defense

closing

argument that

encourages the jury to imagine themselves in the role of the defendant
and how the juror would have explained the causes of her behavior in
that situation. If the jurors are asked to imagine themselves in the
defendant's position, it may help them to appreciate the situational
pressures she was under.273

269. See Jones & Harris, supra note 34, at 10 tbl.2; see also Sheldon Ungar & Aysan
Sev'er, "Say It Ain't So, Ben ": Attributions for a Fallen Hero, 52 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 207
(1989) (hypothesizing and finding evidence for the proposition that when subjects identify
with an actor, and the actor does something disreputable, they are more likely to attribute
his behavior to situational factors).
270. See Jones & Harris, supra note 34, at 12 ("When the prediction task was preceded
by the task of writing a pro-Castro speech under directions, the correlation vanishes. Having
to write a speech against one's own position seems to reduce the significance of that position
when it comes to imputing the attitude of a target person operating under the same
prescription."). This effect has been replicated when subjects are forced to observe their own
behavior from a third-person perspective, for example through a videotape of their actions.
See Michael D. Storms, Videotape and the Attribution Process: Reversing Actors' and
Observers' Points of View, 27 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 165 (1973).
271. Jones & Nisbett, supra note 35.
272. Id. at 7. For a recent recreation and expansion of the Jones & Harris study, see
Shiri Nussbaum et al., Creeping Dispositionism: The Temporal Dynamics of Behavior
Prediction, 84 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 485 (2003).
273. It may be argued that this would be a prohibited "golden rule" argument, which
asks jurors to place themselves in the position of one of the parties. See, e.g., State v.
McHenry, 78 P.3d 403, 410 (Kan. 2003); Forbes v. State, 771 So.2d 942, 950 (Miss. Ct. App.
2000); Gomez v. State, 751 So.2d 630, 632 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); King v. State, 877
S.W.2d 583, 586 (Ark. 1994); Chisolm v. State, 529 So.2d 635, 640 (Miss. 1988). The rationale
for the prohibition is that such an argument, by in effect asking jurors to "do unto" one of
the parties what they would have that party "do unto them," encourages the jury to depart
from neutrality. Loose v. Offshore Navigation, Inc., 670 F.2d 493, 496 (5th Cir. 1982). The
prohibition on golden rule arguments does not, however, apply when used to ask the jury to
assess the reasonableness of a party's actions. See Cummins Ala., Inc., v. Allbritten, 548
So.2d 258, 263 (Fla. Dist. App. 1989) (allowing a golden rule argument in a negligence case
which asked what precautions the jurors, as reasonable people, would have taken). Golden
rule-type jury instructions are also given when a defendant pleads self-defense, which
requires the jury to assess the reasonableness of the defendant's fear of bodily harm. See,
e.g., Hood v. State, 27 So. 643, 644 (Miss. 1900) (finding reversible error where trial court
refused a proposed self-defense jury instruction containing the statement, "[t]he jury must
put themselves, as far as possible, in the defendant Hood's place, and then judge whether the
danger was apparent"); 4 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIM. 411.35 § 2 (2002) ("In deciding

C.

805

Psychology, Factfinding, and Entrapment

February 2005]

Consideration of Inculpating and Exculpating Channel Factors in
Motions for a Ftnding of Entrapment as a Matter of Law
The

consideration

of

channel

factors

provides one

valuable

technique for deciding whether entrapment has been established as a
matter of

law.

In

particular,

judges

can

inform

themselves of

commonly used inculpating and exculpating channel factors, and use
that knowledge when deciding whether to allow the question of
inducement to go to the jury. Should a judge identify the use of
inculpating channel factors, the question of inducement should be
given to the jury only with hesitancy. If, however, the police provided
an

exculpating

channel

factor,

a

judge

can

be

confident

that

inducement is appropriately a question for the jury.
The Supreme Court hinted at such an approach in Masciale v.
United States.214 In Masciale, the defendant was convicted of selling
heroin

to

an

undercover

police

officer.275

In

declining to

find

inducement as a matter of law, the Court noted that the undercover
officer "immediately made it clear that he wanted to talk about buying
large quantities of high-grade narcotics and that if [the defendant]
were not interested, the conversation would end at once."276 The
police, in other words, provided an exculpating channel factor that an
ordinary person would readily utilize to escape from inducing police
conduct,

and a

jury

could

therefore

reasonably

infer

that

the

defendant was not induced.
A judge should conversely weigh in the defendant's favor the use
by the police of the sorts of inculpating channel factors seen in

Connell.211 The most common is the foot-in-the-door technique, which
should be especially considered when the defendant pleads sentencing
entrapment. The foot-in-the-door technique actually consists of two
independent channel factors. First, the defendant is convinced to
commit a minor offense. Second, much like a skilled salesman, the
police provide him with no clear means of extricating himself.
Although these appear to be the two most common inculpating
channel factors, social psychologists have identified a variety of other

whether (the defendant) . . . had reasonable grounds to believe and an honest belief that
he/she was in (imminent) (immediate) danger . . . you must put yourself in the position of
(the defendant) . . . . ) ; TEX. CRIM. JURY CHARGES 12:1100.120 (1999) ("[Y]ou should place
yourselves in the position of the defendant at the time in question and view the
circumstances from his viewpoint alone."). The inducement element of an entrapment
defense similarly requires the jury to assess how a reasonable person would respond to
police pressure, and a golden-rule-type argument should be similarly permissible.
"

274. 356 U.S. 386 (1958).
275. Masciale, 356 U.S. 386 (1958).
276. Id. at 387.
277. United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191 (1st Cir. 1992).
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means of subtly altering behavior including efforts to confuse the
defendant by placing him in a situation in which ordinary expectations
are contradicted278 and providing the defendant with a "role model"
who commits the offense first and receives a benefit.279 Further
research is needed to identify other inculpating and exculpating
channel factors that may be used in sting operations.
CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that the fundamental attribution error
distorts the factual inquiries involved in an entrapment defense. This
persistent dispositional bias makes factfinders especially prone to
attribute criminal conduct to the character traits of the defendant, and
not to situational manipulations by the police. The fundamental
attribution error also produces exceptionally overconfident causal
attributions, which deprives the defendant of some of the benefit of
the reasonable doubt. The Note has also made three suggestions for
reform. First, the objective test for entrapment should be adopted as a
question for the jury. Second, the jury should be instructed in a way
that promotes

deliberation. Finally, when

evaluating entrapment

claims, judges should scrutinize the sting operation for appropriate use
of channel factors.

278. See discussion supra notes 201-202 and accompanying tex_t.
279. See James H. Bryan & Mary Ann Test, Models and Helping: Naturalistic Studies in
Aiding Behavior, 6 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 400 (1967).

